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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TRADE:
A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY SYNTHESIS
Jagdeep S. Bhandari*
I: INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the inter-relationship between interna-
tional migration and international trade in goods and services. Specif-
ically, a central theme is the effect of trade liberalization on incentives
to migrate across countries and, conversely, the effects of international
migration on the need for trade liberalization. Does trade policy liber-
alization lead to greater incentives to migrate across countries? Or, is
such trade reform likely to dampen such incentives and effectively re-
place migration, including illegal immigration? Similarly, does a more
liberalized immigration regime create or replace international trade in
goods and services between the relevant countries?
These issues are of immediate relevance to policymakers in
crafting and evaluating appropriate trade and migration policies. Un-
less the inter-relationship was properly understood, trade reform may
easily undo and undermine the effects of an independently chosen im-
migration stance. History itself provides several examples of trade
and immigration liberalization occurring simultaneously at certain pe-
riods in time, in certain countries, as well as the opposite relationship
in the United States (i.e., trade liberalization coupled with immigra-
tion restrictions). How can these varying policy stances be explained
or reconciled, and what insights does scholarship in various disciplines
offer in this regard?
While various disciplines, including law, political science, eco-
nomics, sociology, ethnic studies, demography, and international rela-
tions, have extensively studied migration and trade, the theoretical
and policy inter-relationship between the two have received very little
attention.1 Additionally, the bulk of the vast literature on trade and
migration is targeted to professional trade theorists, labor economists,
public choice scholars, political scientists, and sociologists and is un-
likely to be easily accessible to the legal profession, to the policy-
* Ph.D., LL.M., J.D., M.S., Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. In
writing this paper, I have received helpful comments from Julia McLaughlin, Ger-
ald Moran, and Christopher Roederer. I am particularly grateful to Jack Chin who
carefully read and commented on an earlier draft. All remaining errors and incon-
sistencies are solely my responsibility.1 Some of the few exceptions that exist are cited at appropriate points below.
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maker, or to inter-disciplinarians in general. This paper is intended to
fill this lacuna in the literature.
The paper analytically surveys and synthesizes the existing
literature on trade and migration, particularly their inter-relation-
ship, from the perspective of several disciplines. In many areas, schol-
arship on the trade-migration relationship is either incomplete or non-
existent. To the extent possible, I have attempted to fairly deduce im-
plications for this relationship from existing analyses in several disci-
plines and marry them in order to present the reader (especially the
policymaker) with a richer framework than has previously existed. I
offer the outline of a multi-disciplinary synthesis of the inter-relation-
ship between trade and migration.
Both the scope and the intended audience for this paper are
much broader than the targeted readership of previous authors. For
the convenience of the reader, I have attempted to precede the princi-
pal discussion in each section by a brief roadmap. In each section, the
trade-migration relationship is emphasized to ensure that the reader
is not unduly distracted by the details of the wealth of material
presented.
Section II contains a discussion of the recent policy debates in-
volving international migration and trade which will set the stage for
the subsequent analytical discussion. While the European Union
chose to address both trade and migration (along with other "free-
doms") simultaneously, the United States pursued a piecemeal ap-
proach to trade liberalization and immigration reform in both public
discourse and legislative enactments.
I discuss historical trends in patterns of trade and cross-border
flows of labor and capital in Section III. Despite the ceaseless current
emphasis on "globalization" and integration, the belle 6poque2 of inte-
gration was, in fact, a time that ended on the eve of the First World
War. For a period of some fifty years prior to that date, the Old and
New Worlds experienced integration in each of trade, finance, and mi-
gration flows to a far larger relative extent than in the closing years of
the last century.
In Section IV, I present and discuss the principal theoretical
constructs proposed by trade and labor theorists that may be capable
of generating falsifiable hypotheses regarding the inter-relationship
between trade and migration. Notably, as originally proposed in these
fields, this inter-relationship has not been at the forefront of attention.
This section illustrates that the inter-relationship between trade liber-
alization and immigration reform can only be unequivocally narrowed
to the simplest theoretical structures. Additional applied and quanti-
2 An era of artistic and cultural refinement in a society, especially in France at the
beginning of the 20th century.
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tative work is necessary to determine the contours of this relationship
in more realistic contexts.
In Section V, I turn to a public choice, or political economy,
framework. Section VI is an omnibus section that examines some of
the literature pertinent to trade and migration in the areas of sociol-
ogy, anthropology, and international relations or international politi-
cal economy. Public choice analysis has dealt primarily with
migration policy rather than trade and has focused on the type of mi-
gration policy that might be preferred by the enfranchised electorate
in liberal democracies. Surprisingly, in many cases, the average voter
prefers a limited amount of illegal migration; this preference is then
articulated by the state through selective enforcement of immigration
laws at both the border and in the interior. Anthropological and polit-
ical studies provide additional valuable insights into migration by ana-
lyzing both the social networks that catalyze both legal and illegal
migration and the role of such networks in socio-economic, linguistic,
cultural, and, ultimately, political assimilation and incorporation of
immigrants into host society. When a sufficient number of new immi-
grants gain meaningful political membership in the host state, the
very meanings of national borders and state sovereignty may be ques-
tioned. This is the domain of international relations scholars.
In Section VII, I briefly discuss empirical evidence regarding
the relationship between trade and migration. A limited amount work
exists so far; it has mainly dealt with examining the relationship be-
tween trade and net immigration flows in simple time-series and
cross-section data. Existing empirical analysis indicates that there is
no apparent or consistent relationship between trade and migration
flows or policies. In part, this finding may be attributed to the limita-
tions and paucity of empirical work thus far performed. The last sec-
tion offers some concluding observations.
II: RECENT PUBLIC POLICY DEBATES
While the relationship between trade and migration has been
theoretically discussed since the 1930s, its policy implications have
only come to occupy the attention of the public and policy-makers re-
cently.3 In the United States, the debate appears to have reached the
3 The theoretical underpinnings in economics pertaining to this issue will be dis-
cussed in further detail below for the benefit of the non-specialist reader. At this
stage, it should be pointed out that readers who are sophisticated in international
economics may find some of the discussion and explanations to be unnecessary or
even over-simplified. For this, I apologize in advance; however, as indicated above,
the intended readership for this paper covers a broad range of professionals in
various disciplines. The genesis of the modern theory of international trade is com-
monly attributed to a paper published in Swedish by Eli Heckscher in 1919 and
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level of legislators, various "watchdogs," and lobbyists just prior to the
regional trade accords between the United States and Canada and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).4 The public policy
debate prior to the ratification of NAFTA in the United States made
for strange bedfellows on either side. Most economists and business
then translated into English some thirty years later. The original work was ex-
tended and refined and explicated by Heckscher's student Bertil Ohlin. Further
refinements to the basic Heckscher-Ohlin framework was carried out by T.M.
Rybczynski in 1955, Ronald Jones in 1965 and by Paul Samuelson, often consid-
ered the wunderkind of the Harvard Ph.D. generation of the 1930s. See generally
Eli Heckscher, The Effect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income, 11 EKO-
NOMISK TIDSKRIFr 497 (The American Economic Association trans., Richard D. Ir-
win, Inc. 1963) (1919); BERTIL OHLIN, INTERREGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(Harvard Univeristy Press 1933) (1967); T.M. Rybczynski, Factor Endowments
and Relative Commodity Prices, 22 ECONOMICA 336 (1955); Wolfgang Stopler &
Paul A. Samuelson, Protection and Real Wages, 9 REV. ECoN. STUD. 58 (1941);
Ronald Jones, The Structure of Simple General Equilbrium Models, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 557 (1965). The basic Hechscher-Ohlin framework, as it is universally
known, provides a simple and very stylized framework with two countries, each
producing two goods by using productive processes utilizing labor and capital. La-
bor and capital are inputs into the production process (and there may be others
such as land, or entrepreneurial talent etc.). Each country is capable of producing
both goods (outputs), but the cost and price structure for producing the goods dif-
fers across countries. Hence, countries have differing comparative advantages in
producing the goods and absent tariffs and transport impediments, the pattern of
free trade can be readily predicted. Countries will export those good that they can
produce at a comparative advantage, vis-A-vis their trading partners and will im-
port the other goods. This is no more than an implication of the benefits of speciali-
zation. The non-specialist reader is referred to an excellent non-technical but
authoritative source such as the THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
(John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 2002) (Palgrave-Macmillan
Reference) for further explanation. The interested reader may also refer to stan-
dard texts in international economics such as PAUL KRUGMAN & MAURICE
OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY (6th ed., Addison Wes-
ley 6th ed. 2002), or RICHARD CAVES, JEFFREY FRANKEL & RONALD JONES, WORLD
TRADE AND PAYMENTS (9th ed., Addison Wesley 9th ed. 2001). See also HISTORY OF
WORLD TRADE SINCE 1450 (John J. McCusker ed., Thompson Gale Publishing
2005).
4 The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 281
(1989) entered into force on January 1, 1989, while the trilateral accord that in-
cluded Mexico, i.e. the Canada-Mexico-United States: North American Free Trade
Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) entered into force on January 1,
1994. Both accords are Congressional-Executive agreements and their treaty sta-
tus, in particular that of NAFTA, under Art. 2 of the U.S. Constitution have been
occasionally questioned. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional? 108 HARv. L. REV. 801 (1995). A much more ambitious pan-Ameri-
can free trade accord (Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)), involves thirty-
four countries in the Americas, and as yet, involves a work in progress.
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interests supported the agreement, while certain environmental
groups, human rights activists, and organized labor opposed it.5
Strangely, the relationship between trade policy and migration
was, at least during the earlier phases of the public debate, neglected.
In part, this may have been because the NAFTA accord itself included
virtually no provisions regarding migration.6 Later in the course of
the debate, some proponents of the trade accord argued that increased
inter-regional trade, as contemplated by NAFTA, would serve to miti-
gate the pressures for illegal migration from Mexico to the United
States.7 Conspicuously absent in the public discourse was any men-
tion of illegal immigration from Canada or of legal immigration from
either Mexico or Canada.'
5 See e.g., James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 27
U.C. DAvis L. REV. 793 (1994); Steve Charnovitz, The North American Free Trade
Agreement: Green Law or Green Spin? 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1994) (con-
cluding that there is very little green about the NAFTA and that much of the Ad-
ministration's rhetoric was false among very many other papers). The AFL-CIO
website lists a host of anti-NAFTA articles. See AFL-CIO website, http://www
.aflcio.org. An unlikely set of coalitions has also emerged to protest the activities of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and has regularly attempted to disrupt the
activities of its ministerial meetings as well as those of other international
organizations.
6 Chapter 16 of the NAFTA accord (entitled "Temporary Entry for Business Per-
sons") contains a number of relatively minor changes to U.S. immigration provi-
sions, principally concerning easing of restrictions on certain classes of non-
immigrant visa applicants, such as business visitors, treaty traders, intra-com-
pany transferees and skilled professionals. Chapter 12 of the Agreement clearly
states that the accord imposes no general obligations regarding immigration or
access to employment upon the state signatories. For a discussion of the labor
provisions of NAFTA, see e.g., Noemi Gal-Or, Labor Mobility Under NAFTA: Regu-
latory Policy Spearheading the Social Supplemental to the International Trade Re-
gime, 15 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 365 (1996) (suggesting that NAFTA simply
provides a strategic super-structure waiting for the addition of labor provisions).
7 For an excellent treatment of the lack of labor mobility provisions on NAFTA,
see Kevin R. Johnson, Free Trade and Closed Borders: NAFTA and Mexican Immi-
gration to the United States, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 937, 965 (1994) (citing a host of
references and arguing that the dichotomy between trade and movement of people
in the NAFTA is a false separation since "labor migration and capital flow are
related to international trade ... [and that] .... [iin the absence of protectionism,
trade among countries with different factor endowments is a substitute for migra-
tion") (emphasis in original). The present paper deals precisely with this issue,
namely, the relationship between trade and migration policy.
8 Illegal immigration from Canada to the United States is not insignificant. This
is especially so since alien smugglers seeking to bring undocumented aliens into
the U.S. increasingly prefer to operate at the U.S.-Canada border rather than at
the much more heavily-patrolled Southwest border of the U.S. See Combating Ille-
gal Immigration: A Progress Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
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The separation of trade policy and migration, both in the policy
debates and accord instruments, appears consistent with two possible
positions from an analytical viewpoint. Policy makers in the United
States (and its trade partners) had either determined (consciously or
by default) that trade and migration were independent of and unre-
lated to each other (with respect to their effects) or that they were sub-
stitutes. The former position is not supported by any conceptual
framework of which I am aware and need not be discussed further.
The second position (i.e., the "substitutability" hypothesis) can be re-
stated as follows: trade liberalization (accomplished via a free trade
accord) is functionally equivalent to the liberalization of restrictions on
labor mobility (migration). Hence, it is unnecessary to liberalize both
trade and migration restrictions simultaneously; either one will ac-
complish the same end. A corollary proposition that follows is that
trade liberalization will reduce the incentives for migration of labor.9
In the popular discourse preceding the implementation NAFTA, this
position appears to have advanced primarily with respect to illegal im-
and Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of
Associate Commissioner George Regan before the Judiciary Committee of the U.S.
House of Representatives). Security of the 5000 mile U.S.-Canada border (in par-
ticular from threats of terrorism) was at the forefront of attention of the U.S. when
it entered into an executive agreement with Canada - Smart Border Declaration -
in December 2001. See also 2004 U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION PER. AND
ANN. REP 1., available at http://www.mipt.org/source.asp?id=365 (last visited Nov.
19, 2006).
9 The hypothesis that trade and labor mobility are substitutes (in their impact
upon factor prices such as wage and rates of return on capital) is a direct implica-
tion of the simplest trade models discussed in Section IV below. More specifically
stated, free trade in goods and services will tend to equalize wage rates and re-
turns to capital (rental rates) across trading partners in the same manner as
would cross-national migration of persons (or capital) from a labor (capital)-abun-
dant country to one in which labor (capital) is scarce. It is in this sense, that trade
and migration may be substitutes (or equivalent). The proposition regarding wage
and rental rates referred to above is known in the international trade literature as
"factor price equalization." A corollary proposition is that protectionism in a coun-
try benefits the relatively scarce factor input, and in converse, free trade would
tend to lower the returns to the scarce factor. Originally stated and proved by
Stopler & Samuelson, supra note 3, this result follows from the basic Heckscher-
Ohlin framework mentioned in note 3 (which is further discussed in Section IV).
The policy implications of the work by Stolper and Samuelson can be readily rec-
onciled with the policy stance adopted by various groups and coalitions in the U.S.,
prior to the NAFTA accord. For example, compared with Mexico, the U.S. is a
labor-scarce economy. Import protection would benefit labor in the U.S., by per-
mitting real wages to stay at high levels, while free trade would erode labor's privi-
leged position. It is hardly surprising then, that organized labor groups in the U.S.
such as the AFL-CIO vociferously opposed the trade accord.
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migration from Mexico.' 0 Neither policy-makers, political coalitions,
nor other participants in the debate appear to have expended much
effort in arguing that trade liberalization as envisioned by NAFTA
would work as a substitute for labor movement in general, i.e., labor
flows including legal migration."
International trade theorists have supported NAFTA, but their
evaluation appears to be a general endorsement that free trade is mu-
tually beneficial to trade economies. 2 Literature in the field of labor
economics has recently attempted to gauge the net effects of legal and
10 In fact, the entire debate over immigration in the U.S. appears to have evolved
in recent times, into one primarily about illegal entrants and undocumented
aliens. For example, the widely-watched TV talk show on CNN ("Lou Dobbs To-
night") has focused virtually nightly on "broken borders" in the U.S. There is a
large amount of literature on estimating the number of illegal aliens residing in
the U.S. and the probable net inflow of such persons. Estimates are typically made
from apprehensions made by the U.S. Border Patrol and from U.S. Census data.
Recent estimates for 2005 made by independent entities such as the Center for
Immigration Studies (CIS), the Pew Hispanic Center and the Federation for Amer-
ican Immigration Reform (FAIR) range from 10-12 million to as high as 20 million.
See Robert Justich & Betty Ng, The Underground Labor Force is Rising to the
Surface, Bear Stears Report, Jan. 3, BEAR STEARNS ASSET MANAGEMENT INC.
(2005), http://www.bearstearns.com/bscportals/pdfs/underground.pdf (last visited
Nov. 19, 2006). As of the time of this writing, the media and Congress appear to
have accepted the figure of 12 million for the total stock of undocumented mi-
grants now present in the U.S.
11 This is not to say that informed writers and officials were unaware of the inter-
dependence between trade and labor flows in general. See, e.g., Johnson, supra
note 6 at 955-956, 961-962, 964. See also Gene McNary, Moving Goods and People
in International Commerce, 2 DuKE J. CoMP. & INT'L L. 247, 247 (1992) (speech
delivered February 6, 1992 at Duke University where the honorable Gene Mc-
Nary, U.S. Commissioner for the INS said, "I feel more than a bit confident in
acknowledging that if immigration is not formally on the table, someone at the
table will sooner or later realize as a practical matter, that moving goods and ser-
vices in international commerce involves moving people who trade in these goods
and services.") See also GARY HUFBAUER ET AL., NAFTA RE-VISITED: ACHIEVEMENTS
AND CHALLENGES 111 (Institute for Internatonal Economics, ed. (2005). During the
course of the public debate leading up to enactment of NAFTA, President Vincente
Fox of Mexico is reported to have remarked that, "the U.S. can choose to import
tomatoes or accept tomato-pickers from Mexico").
12 The "optimality" of free trade for a small country unable to affect its terms of
trade (roughly, world prices for its exportables and importables), under relatively
restrictive assumptions of perfect competition, full information, etc., is an elemen-
tary proposition in international trade. At bottom, the increase in economy wide
(and worldwide) welfare with free trade in goods is traceable to the gains from
specialization in the production of goods. See, e.g., KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra
note 3 at 150-51, 222-23.
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illegal migration on both host and source countries.13 Researchers
have specifically been interested in the impact of migration on host
country wages, the distribution of income and employment, and the
fiscal impact upon state level finances for those states disproportion-
ately affected by immigrant flows.' 4 The source country has also been
studied to determine the effects of migration, especially in the context
of development prospects for the migrating country and the "brain
drain. '15
Unfortunately, economic literature has kept the strands of
trade and labor independent from each another and other disciplines.
Academics have employed frameworks that focus on either labor mar-
kets or the market for traded goods, specifically imports and exports.16
13 Even a semblance of a comprehensive list of references in this area is likely to
occupy an article length manuscript. A seminal contribution in this area is a set of
studies published under the auspices of the National Research Council (NRC). See
generally COMM'N ON BEHAVORIAL & Soc. ScI. & EDUC., NAT'L AcAD. PRESS, THE
NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION
(James Smith & Barry Edmonston, eds., 1997); COMM'N ON BEHAVORIAL & SOC.
ScI. & EDUC., NAT'L ACAD. PRESS, THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE: STUDIES ON THE ECO-
NOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION (James Smith & Barry
Edmonston eds., 1998); GEORGE BORJAS, HEAVEN'S DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (Princeton Univ. Press 2001).
14 In fact, several States (for example, New Jersey, Florida, and Texas) filed suit
against the United States for failing to prevent illegal immigration and seeking to
recover funds expended for educating children of illegal aliens (as required by fed-
eral law) and associated expenses. Not surprisingly, none of the lawsuits resulted
in any judicial relief for the States. See, e.g., Texas v. United States; 106 F.3d 661,
663 (5th Cir. 1997); Chiles v. United States, 1874 F. Supp 1334, 1334 (S.D. Fla.
1994); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 465 (3d Cir. 1996). The U.S.
Supreme Court case establishing the obligation of States with respect to public
education of children of illegal aliens is Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982).
15 The "brain drain" refers to the migration of skilled workers from developing
countries to the advanced Western economies such as the United States. Immigra-
tion policies of developed countries are specifically geared to permitting, or even
encouraging such immigration to meet their own demands for skilled workers.
Under U.S. law, skilled professionals or certain priority workers receive categori-
zation in the first or second employment preference as immigrants and are conse-
quently, subject to much shorter waiting times to enter the U.S. Highly-skilled
non-immigrants are also granted favorable treatment with respect to entry. Simi-
larly, worker skills count toward the "points' needed by immigrants to gain immi-
gration into Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The brain drain
ironically involves a direct transfer from poorer to richer countries, both currently
and prospectively. See also Jones, infra note 88 at 72-75, 81-82. For an overview of
U.S. immigration law, the non-specialist may refer to, Stephen Yale-Loehr, Over-
view of U.S. Immigration Law, 1477 PLI/CORP 49 (2005).
16 For a framework embodying interactions and second-order effects across mar-
kets and sectors, see generally R. Faini, J-M. Grether & J. De Melo, Globalization
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Research in other disciplines, such as political science, sociology, de-
mography, anthropology, and international relations, has also re-
mained dichotomous in nature by failing to integrate migration and
trade or address their mutual inter-relationships. 17
Recently, however, a few economists and some public choice
scholars have devoted renewed attention to the inter-relationship be-
tween trade and migration policies, particularly whether trade and im-
migration policies substitute or complement one another."8 If
substitutable, as previously indicated, trade liberalization alone could
accomplish both free trade and reduced immigration (if these are
viewed as desirable policy goals). Alternatively, if these policies are
complementary, the twin goals of free trade and immigration restric-
tions would necessitate simultaneous reforms in both trade policy and
immigration regime. Even from a purely economic lens, a substitute
relationship between trade and migration emerges only in the simplest
of trade models; once the stark assumptions of such models are modi-
fied, the effects of trade liberalization on incentives to migrate are
highly complex and dependent on the current framework. Clearly ad-
ditional work, specifically empirical analysis, is needed before more
definitive judgments can be made.
Ironically, legal scholars, rather than empirical social scien-
tists have called for integration of trade and migration policies in the
United States. Even before NAFTA's ratification, various legal schol-
ars realized that trade accords would not have addressed consequences
and Migratory Pressures from Developing Countries, in MIGRATION (R. Faini, J. De
Melo & K. Zimmerman, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
17 For the most part, many of these disciplines have contributed to understanding
migration and societal assimilation of newcomers. Hence, demographers or an-
thropologists have had little occasion to study international trade. By contrast,
political scientists and international relations theorists have examined both mi-
gration and trade, albeit separately. The interested reader is referred to the fol-
lowing materials for a sampling of work in these disciplines: in sociology, see
generally FRANK BEAN & GILLIAN STEVENS, AMERICA'S NEWCOMERS AND THE DY-
NAMICS OF DIVERSITY (Russell Sage 2003); SASKIA SAASEN, GUESTS AND ALIENS
(New Press 2000); RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAIN-
STREAM: ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION (Harvard Univ. Press
2005); in political science and political economy see generally I.M. DESTLER, AMER-
IcAN TRADE POLITICS (4th ed., Inst. for Int'l Econ. 2005); WAYNE CORNELIUS ET AL.,
CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Stanford Univ. Press 2004);
in international relations and political economy see generally TOMAS HAMMAR ET
AL., INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Berg Press
1997); and in anthropology and social demography, see generally CAROLINE BRET-
TELL, ANTHROPOLOGY AND MIGRATION; ESSAYS ON TRANSNATIONALISM, ETHNICITY
AND IDENTITY (Altamira Press 2003), among others.
18 See generally MIGRATION, supra note 16. Additional work is cited in Section V
below.
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to migration.' 9 For example, Johnson observes, "[i]n my view, NAFTA
opponents advocating the linkage of immigration and NAFTA cor-
rectly argued that the trade agreement implicated migration is-
sues.... For many reasons, most notably history and geography, the
trade/migration separation is a false dichotomy... ."20 Other authors
have directly stated that not only are trade and migration inter-re-
lated, but that their relationship is also one of substitutability. 2 ' Even
the U.S. Commission for the Study of International Migration created
in 1986 appeared to blithely assume the existence of a substitutability
relationship between trade and migration. 22 The report of the Com-
mission stated, "[t]he issues for many countries is stark; they either
export goods and services to create jobs at home, or they export
people."2
3
As previously mentioned, relatively little basis exists in either
public choice theory or economics to assume that trade and migration
(labor mobility) are functionally equivalent or substitutes, except in
19 See, e.g., Alan C. Nelson, NAFTA: Immigration Issues Must Be Addressed, 27
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 987 (1994); McNary, supra note 11; Johnson, supra note 7.
Writers have noted that the omission of immigration reform in conjunction with
implementation of NAFTA is to be rationalized in terms of the political accommo-
dations that were expedient at the time. As it stood, NAFTA passed Congress only
narrowly; the political coalitions in the U.S. that supported the NAFTA would
have been quite insufficient to overcome anti-immigrant lobbies to permit coupling
of the trade accord with labor mobility provisions. All parties agreed that NAFTA
would have some immigration implications, but it was strategically expedient to
not delve into this issue too deeply. The fact that the state parties to NAFTA in-
cluded certain accords with respect to environmental and labor standards issues
indicates that it was not necessary to limit NAFTA to trade issues alone. In fact,
this "tactical issue linkage" may have been necessary to garner sufficient support
to enable Congressional passage of the accord. Environmental issues are dealt
with in Ch. 27 and labor protection issues in Ch. 28 of the NAFTA accord. At the
same time, the plain text of the accord expressly reserves national autonomy of
immigration policies to each sovereign state party.
20 Johnson, supra note 7, at 942.
21 See, e.g., Dolores Acevedo & Thomas Espenshade, Implications of a North
America Free Trade Agreement for Mexican Migration into the United States, 18
POPULATION & DEV. REV. 729, 730 (1992), cited in id. at 965-66 (observing that "in
the absence of protectionism, trade among countries with different factor endow-
ments is a substitute for migration. In other words, if countries with an abundance
of labor can specialize in the production of labor-intensive goods, there need not be
labor migration to more developed countries")
22 UNITED STATES COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND
COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION: AN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE (1990) (report of bipartisan commission created by Con-
gress under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA")).
23 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
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the very simplest trade models or constructs of early vintage.24 Nor
does an examination of the historical evolution of trade and migration
patterns in many parts of the world suggest the consistent existence of
such a relationship.25 In fact, both modem theoretical analyses and
empirical historical evidence indicate that, in many cases, trade liber-
alization is complementary to increased international mobility of labor
and capital (i.e., increased migration of labor and/or increased cross
border capital flows). 26 Logically, if trade liberalization and migration
truly are (or were) substitute policies, that alone would imply that a
trade liberalizing accord could well ignore addressing migration is-
sues, if, and only if, all concerned policy-makers are purely concerned
with the economic impact of such measures. Events in the United
States subsequent to ratification of NAFTA belie the substitutability
hypothesis, and, in particular, suggest that trade liberalization and in-
creased migration (especially illegal immigration) were popularly
viewed as complementary.27
Examination of immigration and trade legislation enacted in
the U.S. from the mid-1980s to the present suggests that, excepting
the 1990 enactments, the immigration regime became increasingly re-
strictive despite trade policy continuing its already established liberal-
izing trend. The U.S. engagement in trade agreements over this
period included its continued participation in the multilateral 1986-
1994 Uruguay Round (culminating in the World Trade Organization
accord in 1994 together with supplemental agreements reached in
1997), followed by the Doha Round of negotiations that commenced in
Doha, Qatar in 2001.28 At the same time, the United States also nego-
24 See generally ROBERT J. FLANAGAN, GLOBALIZATION AND LABOR CONDITIONS (Ox-
ford University Press 2006).
25 See generally KEVIN H. O'ROURKE & JEFFERY G. WILLIAMSON, GLOBALIZATION
AND HISTORY: THE EVOLUTION OF A NINETEENTH-CENTURY ATLANTIC ECONOMY
(MIT Press, 1999).26 See generally Flanagan, supra note 24.
27 Initially, economists assessing the impact of NAFTA on the U.S. economy ap-
pear to have generally concluded, that enactment of NAFTA would only margin-
ally increase illegal immigration into the U.S., and that too on a temporary basis.
See, e.g., GARY C. HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, NAFTA: AN ASSESSMENT (Inst.
for Int'l Econ. revised ed. 1993). Later work though, appears to suggest NAFTA
might contribute to a measurable degree to an "illegal migration hump" in that
rural dislocations traceable to NAFTA might increase illegal migration from Mex-
ico to the U.S. for a period of 10-15 years before changing demographics and eco-
nomic development in Mexico reduced the pressure to migrate northward from
Mexico. See NAFTA RE-VISITED, supra note 11.
28 See, e.g., RUTH ELLEN WASEM, IMMIGRATION ISSUES IN TRADE AGREEMENTS (Con-
gressional Research Service, 2005); Country Trade Agreements, U.S. Dep't of
Agric. Foreign Agric. Serv. (2006), available at http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/agree-
ments/country.asp (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
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tiated a number of regional trade agreements with several countries,
including three with Arab countries.2 9
Although no fewer than ninety pieces of legislation have been
enacted into public law in the United States since 1985 (many contain-
ing technical amendments or appropriations provisions), not to men-
tion others that are pending, four enactments deserve special mention.
In 1986, Congress specifically aimed at the undocumented alien prob-
lem and enacted the Immigration and Reform Control Act (IRCA).3 °
For the first time in U.S. immigration history, U.S. employers who
knowingly employed undocumented workers faced penalties and sanc-
tions.3 ' Interestingly, no corresponding penalties were imposed on the
workers themselves. Even more significantly, some 2.7 million illegal
aliens were concurrently "amnestied" (including some 1.1 million spe-
cial agricultural workers).3 2 By imposing employer penalties, Con-
gress obviously hoped to reduce unscrupulous employers' demand for
illegal aliens in the United States. In turn, these impositions were
also expected to reduce the ultimate inflow of such persons into theU.S. 33
Shortly thereafter, Congress enacted the Immigration Act of
1990 (IMMACT90). 34 This Act did not reflect any specific Congres-
sional concern with undocumented aliens. Instead, it increased the
worldwide annual quota of legal immigrants to be admitted to the U.S.
by over thirty percent to 700,000 per year for the fiscal years 1992-94
29 These include free trade agreements reached with Israel (1985), Canada (1989),
NAFTA (1994), Jordan (2000), Singapore (2003), Australia (2004), Bahrain (2004),
Chile (2004), Morocco (2004) and the seven-nation plurilateral accord, DR-CAFTA,
in mid-2005. See, e.g., Country Trade Agreements, supra note 28. Still pending is
the thirty-four nation FTAA Pan-American accord, which was originally scheduled
to be completed by end of 2005.
30 Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a).
31 Id.
32 Karen A. Woodrow-Lafield, Estimating Authorized Migration, in 2 MIGRATION
BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES: BINATIONAL STUDY 619 (Mexican Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs & U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform eds., 1998).
33 The actual ultimate inflow is a combination of both the demand for such per-
sons by U.S. employers and of the supply of workers willing to relocate illegally to
the U.S. The extent of illegal immigration cannot be known with certainty, but is
usually proxied by a multiple of border apprehensions. See, e.g., Gordon Hanson &
Antonio Spilimbergo, Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement and Relative
Wages: Evidence from the Apprehensions at the US-Mexico Border (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5592) (1996).
34 Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 8 & 29 U.S.C.).
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and to 675,000 thereafter. 35 Congress' decision to increase the world-
wide quota for employment-based immigrants reflected changing eco-
nomic realities in the world workplace and the apparent shortage of
skilled workers and professionals in the U.S. labor force. This quota
more than doubled, jumping from 54,000 to 140,000; at the same time,
liberalizing provisions in certain non-immigrant visa categories (such
as H-1B) were added. 3' Although IMMACT90 was a milestone in the
liberalization of U.S. immigration policy, it did not specifically address
illegal immigration. IMMACT90 was enacted just one year after the
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Accord of 1989, but NAFTA wasn't ratified
until several years later in 1994.
Some years later, following the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing in New York and the Oklahoma City federal building bomb-
ing in 1995, Congress further streamlined the procedures for removal
of criminal aliens charged with terrorism. The passage of the Antiter-
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) effectuated
this objective and placed great limits on the scope of habeas corpus
appeals in such cases. 3' By itself, AEDPA was largely symbolic, and
by 1998 when the AEDPA was in full effect, only 61,000 criminal
aliens were removed from the U.S.38 This number is clearly inconse-
quential when compared with the both government removal of almost
twice that many non-criminal aliens in the same span of time and the
entry of perhaps 800,000 illegal aliens in 1996 alone.39
That year was a particularly busy one for immigration reform.
Congress also enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), Title V of which amended and re-incorpo-
rated the new Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act.40
IIRIRA was enacted precisely ten years after IRCA and took aim at
35 The actual number of immigrants admitted in fact, exceeds the quota amount,
because a number of immigrants (such as refugees and "immediate relatives" of
U.S. citizens) are exempt from the quota. See Population Resource Center, Execu-
tive Summary: U.S. Immigration: A Legislative History (2004), http://www.prcdc
.org/summaries/usimmighistory/usimmighistory.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
36 See Miguel Lawson & Marianne Lin, The Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-649, 33 HARv. INT'L L.J. 255, 258 (1992) (summarizing the main provisions of
IMMACT90).
37 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214.
38 See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SE-
CURITY, 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, Table 43 (2004).
39 See OFFICE OF POLICY & PLANNING SERVICE, U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZA-
TION SERV., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN
THE US: 1990-2000, at Chart 2.
40 Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, 110 Stat. 3009.
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both illegal and legal immigrants. In addition to increasing appropria-
tions for border patrol personnel,4 1 IIRIRA removed illegal aliens
from most means-tested federal public assistance programs 4 2 (al-
though the States remained free to fill in the gaps to the extent of their
limited fiscal capabilities). Additionally, legal immigrants entering
the United States were also barred from such means-tested programs
for a five-year period. IIRIRA also contained a host of other restrictive
amendments and innovations, including some relating to improved
monitoring of aliens known to be present in the U.S.
As is well-known, intelligence gathering with respect to certain
aliens received a much stronger boost in the USA PATRIOT Act of
2001. 41 Congressional concern with international terrorism and alien
entry into the United States (whether lawful or surreptitious), contin-
ued to be reflected in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Preven-
tion Act of 2004. 44 As of this writing, the issue of amnesty or
legalization of unlawfully present aliens is once again high on the Con-
gressional agenda and at the forefront of attention of the media and
general public; only this time there may be as many 12 million persons
who are migrants irr~guliers instead of 3 million, as in 1986. 4 5
41 Id. § 101.
42 Id. §§504, 510.
43 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
44 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,
118 Stat. 3638.
45 As of this writing, both the House and Senate have passed varying, but far-
reaching immigration bills. The House bill (Sensenbrenner-King bill, H.R. 4437,
109th Cong. (2005)), passed on December 16, 2005, focuses almost entirely on im-
migration enforcement and contains no amnesty provisions for currently present
unauthorized migrants. On May 25, 2006, the Senate passed the Hagel-Martinez
bill, (S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006)), of which an important component deals with
legalization and possible eventual citizenship of an estimated 11-12 million un-
documented aliens. Among other provisions, the House version would make con-
tinued presence of undocumented aliens in the U.S. a federal crime, while under
current law, only the initial entry is unlawful. It would also delegate considerable
immigration enforcement authority to state and local authorities and would seek
to statutorily overturn or limit prior court rulings such as Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678 (2001) and Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) by permitting unre-
viewable, potentially indefinite detention of certain aliens. Apart from the am-
nesty provisions, the Senate version is far more liberal by also authorizing a very
substantial increase in legal immigration in the future (for example, by more than
doubling the quota for employment-based immigrants and by creating a new H-2C
visa permitting 200,000 low skills workers annually to work in the U.S., for up to
six years. The liberalization provisions reflect the sense of the Senate of a growing
shortage in the U.S. of both low-skills and high-skills workers. Given the sharp
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This piecemeal approach employed in the United States, with
respect to trade policy and immigration reform, is consistent with the
view (at least among relevant policy makers and legislators) that trade
liberalization with Mexico was not likely to produce much of a
favorable impact upon incentives to migrate to the United States, i.e.,
that these policies were not substitutes. Moreover, the sequential ap-
proach employed in the United States to trade and migration reform
starkly contrasted to the European Union's approach. The well known
"four freedoms" envisioned by the Treaty of Rome and its subsequent
instruments encompass the free movement of goods, services, capital,
and persons within the Member States of the European Union.46
While the phase-in periods for full implementation of these four free-
doms have varied because of capital account liberalization occurring
somewhat later than trade liberalization, of interest is the suprana-
tional structure of the European Union's decision-making machinery
permitting the establishment of at least a theoretical blueprint and
simultaneously encompassing current account and capital account lib-
eralization, as well as free labor mobility.4 7 ,48
differences in the bills, it appears unlikely that a compromise version will be
reached until after the 2006 elections.
46 These "four freedoms" form the pillars of the European integration. See Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573, (In-
corporating changes made by the Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C.
224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 (hereinafter TEU). The TEU,
id., amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) (the original
instrument for European integration) as amended by Single European Act, O.J.L.
169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741) in Treaties Establishing the Euroepan Com-
munities (EC Offl Pub. Off. 1987). The facilitation of free movement of persons
within the European Union and the elimination of border checks for persons al-
ready admitted to one member state was sought to be addressed in the Schengen
Accords. See Schengen Agreement on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at Their
Common Borders and the Convention Applying the Agreement, Jan. 1991, 30
I.L.M. 68, 69, 73, 84 (in four parts). The Schengen Accords were later modified by
the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, Oct. 2, 1997,
1997 O.J. (C 340) 1.
47 The terms current account and capital account may be described as follows: the
current account and capital account of a country together comprise the balance of
payments. The latter is a systematic record of a country's economic transactions
with the rest of the world over a period of time (such as a quarter or a year).
Inflows and outflows of capital movements are recorded in the capital account.
Capital movements can either involve foreign direct investment (FDI) (such as ac-
quisition of physical capital assets abroad) or portfolio investment (which repre-
sents sales or purchases across countries of financial assets, such as bonds or
equities). The current account is composed primarily of the trade balance and the
service account. Of these, the trade account is more commonly known to non-spe-
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In the next Section, I turn to an examination of historical
trends in trade flows and factor flows (migration of labor and capital).
Analytical constructs or models are usefully evaluated in terms of
their ability to first explain the historical record and then to be used
for their possible predictive power for the future.
III: HISTORICAL TRENDS
In this Section, I discuss historical trends and empirical regu-
larities in the patterns of trade flows, flows of capital, and interna-
tional migration of labor. These trends indicate that increased trade
in goods and services accompanied a vastly increased international
mobility of both capital and labor flows during an earlier period that
ended on the eve of the First World War; the relationship between
cialists; it records the values of imports and exports of goods and services of a
particular country. The service account records payments and receipts of interest
(for example on previous capital transactions), dividends, royalties, patent,
franchise, license fees, etc. For additional details, the interested reader may con-
sult sources such as THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note
3 or KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 3.
4s There is very considerable literature (both in development economics and in law
and development) on the "sequencing" of reforms, with most mainstream econo-
mists and legal policy makers recommending trade or current account liberaliza-
tion first, followed by domestic financial reform (including the domestic banking
system) and only then, external capital account liberalization. Current account lib-
eralization refers both to the reduction of tariffs, as well as, the elimination of
restrictions on payments for current account transactions. Domestic financial re-
form includes elimination of "financial repression" (repressive regulations that in-
hibit free competition), "crony capitalism" (the practice of permitting or requiring
state-influenced banks make loans of dubious quality to uncreditworthy cronies of
government bureaucrats), and the maintenance of adequate capital reserves
against outstanding loans. Capital account restrictions are those that implicitly or
explicitly tax or limit outflows or inflows of capital and are not permitted under
the IMF Articles of Agreement. See International Monetary Fund Articles of
Agreement, art. VI (3), Jul. 22, 1944 ("[mlembers may exercise such controls as are
necessary to regulate international capital movements, but no member may exer-
cise these controls in a manner which will restrict payments for current transac-
tions."). Id. Cross-border movements of short-term "speculative" capital can be
especially destabilizing and can lead to the "twin crises" of currency and stock
market collapse, accompanied by banking failures. More complete treatments can
be found in several sources including the following: PIERRE-RICHARD AGENOR &
PETER MONTIEL, DEVELOPMENT MACROECONOMICS (2d ed., Princeton Univ. Press
1999); HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, VOL. III (Gene Grossman &
Kenneth Rogoff eds., Elsevier Science 1997); CAPITAL FLOWS AND EMERGING Eco-
NOMICS: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND CONTROVERSIES (Sebastian Edwards ed., Univ.
Chi. Press 2000).
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trade and migration was complementary.49 Contrary to a commonly
held belief, global integration achieved during the closing years of the
twentieth century was less impressive in scope and extent than in the
earlier period (the belle gpoque).5 ° While trade and capital flows
across countries registered large increases during the later period, in-
ternational mobility of labor, measured in relative terms, has not kept
pace with the growth in trade and capital flows.51 Historical evidence
does not support the existence of a complementary relationship be-
tween trade and immigration flows in recent times.52
A: Recent Trends in Trade in Goods and Services
International flows of goods and cross-border flows of services
have grown much more rapidly than output or Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) in the latter part of the twentieth century. This is true whether
comparisons are made for trade flows for most countries individually
or in terms of world trade flows on a gross basis.53 For example, world
trade flows, measured in real terms, grew at an annualized rate of 4.1
percent during the 1980s and at a rate of 9.1 percent annually over the
1990s, while world real output growth was, respectively, 3.1 percent
and 2.6 percent.54 Within trade in goods and services, international
trade in services has grown much more rapidly than merchandise ex-
ports and imports. Traditional services, transport, insurance, and
travel, account for approximately half of total trade in services. How-
ever, growth in trade of newer services, such as computer and informa-
tion services, has been especially rapid since the 1990s.
49 See generally MIGRATION, supra note 16; OECD in Figures, in OECD OBSERVER
(OECD, et al. eds., 2005); Organization of Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, OECD Factbook (2005); OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
Geneva, Switz., UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2004); United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., Development and Globalization:
Facts and Figures (2004); United States Census Bureau Reports, Foreign Direct
Investment database, http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.
aspx?CSreferer=&CSChosenLang=en (last visited Nov. 19, 2006); Source
OECD, http://titania.sourceoecd.org/vl=1085826/cl=23/nw=l/rpsv/home.htm (last
visited Nov. 19, 2006).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Gross terms means exports plus imports. Alternatively, it is possible to examine
trends in the average level of exports and imports (when adjusted for differing
units).
54 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz.,
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics at Table 7.2 (2004).
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Clearly, this rapid growth in trade flows compared with output
suggests increased "openness" of the economies in question.5 5 Nota-
bly, while most industrial economies have indeed experienced a recent
increase in openness as measured by the ratio of gross trade to output,
it is by no means true that openness or globalization is exclusively a
late twentieth century phenomenon. A number of historians, particu-
larly economic historians, have convincingly demonstrated the emer-
gence and existence of a strongly integrated Atlantic economy prior to
the First World War. In fact, by the early twentieth century, the com-
bined old and new industrialized worlds had already attained an im-
pressive degree of openness.5 6  Following this golden era of
globalization, the industrial world underwent rapid de-globalization
until after the end of the Second World War. Thereafter, the advent of
the Cold War and the proliferation of socialist or Marxist economic and
political philosophies in several countries caused a slow re-globaliza-
tion. Therefore, the final years of the twentieth century can be viewed
as a partial recovery from the de-globalization that occurred after the
1920s. It does still remain true, however, that national borders matter
for trade and commerce to a surprisingly large extent.5 7
B: Recent Trends in Flows of Capital and Labor
Have flows of capital and labor become as internationally mo-
bile or migratory as flows of good and services? Defining capital is
more difficult than defining labor because capital encompasses both
55 There are several measures of "openness." A simple (and very limited) eco-
nomic measure is the proportion of gross trade to total output. Other economic
measures relate to "financial openness" of the country in question, measured per-
haps by the degree of foreign penetration of local banking and related financial
systems. To scholars in disciplines other than economics openness (or inter-con-
nectedness with the rest of the world) conjures up different images and measures.
Thus, the sociologist might examine the penetration by foreign multinationals, ex-
tent of foreign tourism, international telephone calls made or received, etc. The
demographer and anthropologist would likely focus on the changing ethnic mix of
the local country's population, linguistic and culinary transformations, extent of
inter-marriages and related measures. To the political economist and to the inter-
national relations theorist, openness may be consonant with erosion of national
political sovereignty and the increasing ascendancy of international norms and
legal cultures.
56 See, e.g., GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (Michael Bordo, Alan Tay-
lor & Jeffrey Williamson eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 2003); JEFFREY WILLIAMSON
& KEVIN O'RouRKE, GLOBALIZATION AND HISTORY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A 19TH
CENTURY ATLANTIC ECONOMY (MIT Press 1999); JAMES FOREMAN-PECK, HISTORI-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF GLOBALIZATION (Edward Elgar Publishing 1998).
57 See e.g. JOHN HELLIWELL, How MUCH Do NATIONAL BORDERS MATTER? (Brook-
ings Inst. Press 1998).
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physical capital and financial portfolio investment. Capital can in-
clude transnational transactions of an ever-increasing variety of finan-
cial instruments such as stocks, bonds, options, futures, derivatives,
etc.
Growth in cross-border foreign direct investment during the
last years of the twentieth century has been even faster than growth in
merchandise trade. United Nations UNCATAD FDI Database Reports
state that annual inflows of world foreign direct investment increased
approximately 400 percent between 1980 and 1990 and close to an-
other 650 percent between 1990 and 2000.58 Similarly, cross-border
portfolio capital transactions have exhibited an accelerating rate of
growth during the same period.5 9 Thus, capital flows, whether of
physical or financial capital, appear to have become much more migra-
tory across national borders; this parallels or exceeds the worldwide
increase in merchandise and service trade.6 °
Turning now to international migration, cross-border flows of
labor have been the laggard in the globalization process characterizing
trade and capital movements over the last decades of the twentieth
century. Except for the United States, the percentages of foreign-born
and foreign populations in most developed countries (excepting per-
haps Italy) have exhibited relatively little change during the last
twenty years of the last century. The following figures are adapted
from various issues of official OECD publications.
58 See Foreign Direct Investment database, Major FDI Indicators, http://stats
.unctad.org/FDITableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=5 (last visited Nov. 19,
2006).
59 Cross-border mergers and acquisitions also occurred at an increasing pace over
this period. In 1990, approximately 5,000 cross-border mergers and acquisitions
were notified to UNCTAD and in 2000, there were 15,000 such mergers. See
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
2005 (2005); Foreign Direct Investment database, http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/Re-
portFolders/ReportFolders.aspx?CS referer=&CSChosenLang=en (last visited
Nov. 19, 2006).
60 The reasons for the increase in both trade and capital flows have been myriad.
With respect to trade flows, the chief reasons are reductions in transport and com-
munication costs and the consciously liberalizing trade regimes adopted in many
countries. Average transport costs for imports fell from approximately 8 percent of
total import costs in 1970 to about 3 percent in 2002. See Mark Dean & Maria
Sebastia-Barriel, Why Has World Trade Grown Faster Than World Output? Quar-
terly Bulletin, Bank of England (Autumn 2004). It should also be observed that, in
part, the recorded increase in trade is due to increased specialization in production
and the growth in intra-industry trade or input trade caused by "splicing up" of
production processes across several countries. See Paul Krugman, Growing World
Trade: Causes and Consequences, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcON. ACTrvTY 327
(1995); Richard Feenstra, Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in
the Global Economy, 12 J. EcoN. PERSPECTIVEs 31 (1998).
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PERCENTAGES OF FOREIGN-BORN AND FOREIGN
POPULATIONS IN TOTAL POPULATION 6 1
Early 1980s Early 1990s 2001
Belgium 9.0 9.1 8.2
France 6.8 6.3 5.6*
Germany 7.4 8.5** 8.9
Italy 0.7 1.7 2.4
UK 2.8 3.5 4.3
USA 6.2 7.9 11.1
Canada 16.1 16.1 18.2
* Refers to 1999
** Refers to unified Germany
The relative stagnancy in the percentages of foreign-born and
foreign populations of the developed nations is even more noteworthy
in light of the sharp decline in transport and communication costs dur-
ing this period, particularly with the growing disparities between in-
come levels across rich and poor nations.6 2 Much of the economic
literature on internal and international migration has stressed the im-
portance of differences in expected wage levels as an explanation of
migration flows. 63 By contrast, sociologists and researchers in other
fields have emphasized "network effects" and similar "social capital" in
explaining migration.6 4 The relative international immobility of labor,
despite the increased incentives to migrate on account of perceived
wage differentials, closer social "networks," etc., can be rationalized in
61 Trends in International Migration, ANN. REP. (Org. Econ. Co-operation Dev.,
Paris).
62 Available evidence suggests that, if anything, per capita income gaps between
the rich and poor countries and, in particular, gaps in other broader indicators of
human development or "wellness" have widened in recent years. See Human De-
velopment Reports, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Various Is-
sues and the World Development Report 2006; EQUITY AND DEVELOPMENT, World
Bank (2005).
63 Internal migration literature of early vintage can be traced to the now-classic
work of Harris and Todaro among others; John Harris & Michael Todaro, Migra-
tion, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis, 60 AM. ECON. REV.
126 (1970). More recent literature on migration includes ODED STARK, THE MIGRA-
TION OF LABOR (Basil Blackwell 1991) and ALTRUISM AND BEYOND (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1999). See also, George Borjas, The Economics of Immigration, 32 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1667 (1994); ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF IMMIGRATION (George
Borijas ed. Univ. of Chicago Press 2000).
64 See discussion infra Sections V and VI.
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terms of more effective policing of borders in most developed countries
over the relevant time period.6566
It appears that in the closing years of the twentieth century,
trade flows and flows of capital stood in a complementary relationship;
increased trade was associated with increased cross-border capital
flows. On the other hand, international migration of labor did not ex-
hibit a similar increase or any appreciable increase relative to base
population over the same time period. This pattern - increased trade
and capital flows without a corresponding increase in labor flows -
contrasts with the earlier phase of globalization of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries.67
C: Historical Patterns in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Century
The discussion turns now to the period before World War I.
Exports in the industrialized world between 1870 and 1913 grew at an
average annual rate of 4 percent while output increased at a growth
rate of 2.6 percent per year.68 However, in contrast to the present,
increased goods market and capital market integration in the earlier
65 It should be emphasized that the text refers to immobility of labor flows across
borders, relative to the much greater mobility across borders of goods and of capi-
tal. In absolute numbers, cross-border labor flows, on a worldwide basis, have in-
deed been increasing steadily. However, the rate of growth of international labor
flows has been far smaller than that for growth in cross border trade in goods,
services, and capital.
66 Beginning in the mid-eighties of the last century, cross-border labor flows have
increasingly included an illegal component. In some countries, inbound immigra-
tion, especially illegal immigration, has been a new experience. In the past, such
countries had traditionally been sending countries. For example, countries in the
Southern Cone of Europe, such as Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, appear to
have experienced substantial amounts illegal immigration from Latin America,
Eastern Europe and Asia. For example, Italy and Greece have experienced large
flows of immigrants from Albania, while Spain has witnessed illegal immigration
from the Dominican Republic and El Salvador. The novelty of the phenomenon in
these countries is underscored by the fact that they did not have either asylum or
amnesty programs (termed "regularization programmes" in Europe) until very re-
cently. See, e.g., IMMIGRATION AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY IN SOUTHERN EUROPE
(Martin Baldwin-Edwards & Joaquin Arango eds., Frank Cass Publishers 1999);
SOUTHERN EUROPE AND THE NEW IMMIGRATIONS (Russell King & Richard Black
eds., Sussex Acad. Press 1999); IMMIGRANTS AT THE MARGINS: RACE, LAW AND Ex-
CLUSION IN SOUTHERN EUROPE, KTTY CALAVITA (Cambridge University Press
2005).
67 See KRUGMAN, supra note 43; Jeffrey Sachs and Jeffrey A. Warner, Economic
Reform and the Process of Global Integration, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECO-
NOMIC ACTIVITY 1-95 (1995).
68 See KRUGMAN, supra note 43; MIGRATION, supra note 16.
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period was also accompanied by considerable international labor mo-
bility or migration flows. The following tables present data on inter-
continental migration flows from Europe to the New World from the
perspective of both the sending and destination countries.
EMIGRATION AS PERCENTAGE OF HOME COUNTRY
POPULATION 69
1871-80 1901-1910 1913
Austria-Hungary 0.03 0.48 0.61
Germany 0.15 0.05 0.04
Ireland 0.67 0.70 0.68
Italy 0.11 1.08 1.63
Spain 0.36 0.57 1.05
United Kingdom 0.50 0.65 1.04
EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION AS PERCENTAGE OF HOME
COUNTRY POPULATION 70
1871-80 1901-1910 1913
Argentina 1.17 2.92 3.83
Canada 0.55 1.68 3.84
USA 0.55 1.02 1.22
The next table reports the percentage of various European
countries' population[s] in 1900 that emigrated over a 75-year period
spanning 1846-1924.
PERCENTAGE OF 1900 POPULATION 7 1
Austria-Hungary
British Isles (UK)
France
Germany
Italy
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
10.4
40.9
1.3
8.0
29.2
35.9
30.9
23.2
13.2
69 Imre Ferenczi and Walter Willcox, eds., International Migrations, vol. 1,
Statistics (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1929), p. 1028.
70 Id.
71 Douglas Massey, International Migration and Economic Development in
Comparative Perspective, 14 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 383 (1988).
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Migration of labor as a percentage of sending countries' popula-
tion and redundant of host countries' population witnessed a sharply
increasing trend between 1870-1913. For example, Italian emigration
(as a percentage of total base population) increased almost fifteen-fold
(from .11 percent to 1.63 percent) over this period. Similarly, Euro-
pean immigration as a percentage of host country populations more
than doubled in the United States and increased approximately 700
percent in Canada over the same period.72 Figures for total emigra-
tion as a percentage of population in 1900 (for selected countries) over
the 75-year period (1846-1924) are instructive. Over this period, more
than 40 percent of the total population in Britain had emigrated, with
similarly high percentages for Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Norway.
France and Germany apparently did not participate in empire-build-
ing through colonization and emigration to the same extent as Britain,
Spain and Portugal.73
Turning specifically to immigration into the United States, I
report below the figures for net immigration, U.S. total population and
the immigration rate (in percentages) for a number of years between
1880-2004. TM
Year Net Immigration Population Immigration Rate (%)
1880 457.257 50,155.783 0.91
1890 455.302 62,622.250 0.71
1900 488.572 75,994.575 0.64
1905 1,026.499 83,822.000 1.22
1910 1,041.570 91,972.266 1.13
1914 1,218.480 99,111.000 1.22
1960 265.398 179,325.671 0.15
1970 373.326 203,210.158 0.18
1980 530.639 226,545.805 0.23
1990 1,536.483 248,709.873 0.62
2000 849.807 281,421.906 0.30
2004 946.142 293,656.842 0.32
NOTE: Figures are in hundreds of thousands. Rates in the last column are
in percentages.
Figures for the United States make it clear that even in terms
of levels the total numbers of immigrants admitted to the United
States in last ten years fall short of levels attained almost a hundred
years ago between 1905-1914. In terms of rates, the contrast is even
72 See table in the text.
73 It was only in the middle and late 1930s that the German government began to
implement its rocambolesque notion of empire-building by militarily seeking le-
bensraum (living space).
74 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS (2004).
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more telling since the total U.S. population is currently much larger.
Immigration rates (immigration relative to total population) in the
United States are now less than one third of the corresponding rates in
the early part of the last century despite vast reductions in transporta-
tion and communication costs across borders.
Consequently, the earlier period of world integration was char-
acterized by a universality of rapid integration of goods, capital, and
labor markets. Cross-border flows of goods, labor, and capital in-
creased substantially relative to output. Thus, trade, capital and mi-
gration flows complemented each other during this period of
globalization. In contrast, the recent phase of globalization in the late
twentieth century proceeded without exhibiting a complementary rela-
tionship between trade and migration of labor.
Shortly after the end of the First World War, the doors of open
immigration policies in the New World began to slam shut; this corre-
sponds roughly to the end of the expansion of the New Frontier in the
American West and the end of the Prairie Boom in Canada. It was to
take several years more, however, before the switch to closed borders
was to be completed, both in the New World and in Europe.7 5
IV: TRADE AND MIGRATION: THEORETICAL
UNDERPINNINGS IN ECONOMICS
As discussed above, the observed links between trade flows and
international migration have not exhibited a consistent pattern over
time. This section discusses the theoretical constructs in economic
theory that generate testable hypotheses about these links.7 6
75 The first U.S. legislation that imposed numerical restrictions on immigrants
was the Quota Law of 1921, 42 Stat. 5 (1921). At that time, quota immigrants were
limited primarily to Western and Northern Europe. In 1952, the McCarran-Wal-
ters Act was the first comprehensive immigration legislation in the U.S. Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). The INA of 1952 retained
the discriminatory national origins quota system that was finally repealed in the
1965 Amendments. INA Amendments of October 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79
Stat. 911 (1965). Passport requirements to enter the U.S. were not instituted until
an executive order in 1915. For an excellent history of the 1965 Amendments see
Gabriel Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A New Look
at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996). See
also MAE NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MOD-
ERN AMERICA (2005) (discussing various statutory enactments in the context of the
emergence of the legal and social category of illegal migrants in the U.S.).
76 It should be pointed out that the ostensible purpose of both trade and immigra-
tion laws is grounded in economics. The overwhelming majority of trade legisla-
tion is directed at leveling the playing field, i.e., permitting free market forces to
determine the patters and extent of trade, based upon interference-free determi-
nation of comparative advantage in production. To this end, there exist anti-dump-
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A: General Comments and Conclusions
The principal conclusion of this analysis is that, in a highly
stylized setting with several simplifying assumptions, free trade or in-
creased trade between nations is a substitute for international migra-
tion. However, in a more general setting, and once certain stark
simplifying assumptions are relaxed, the theoretical relationship be-
tween trade flows and migration is ambiguous and highly dependent
upon the framework of the analysis. This conclusion implies that fur-
ther empirical work is required to determine the suitability of models
or constructs to particular countries and contexts.77
Even on a casual basis, the relationship between trade and mi-
gration policies exhibits inter-relationships on multiple levels, i.e., a
two-way relationship exists between the policy stance and the effects
of the policy. For example, immigration policy7" is itself responsive to
immigration flows. Large undesired flows of immigrants precipitate a
more restrictive immigration policy. In turn, restrictive immigration
policy79 affects actual immigrant inflows into the country in question.
ing statutes, countervailing duty laws, unfair trade practices remedies and Escape
Clause relief, etc. Unlike trade, migration is determined, in part, by absolute
rather than comparative advantage. Migrants move across borders, partly in re-
sponse to perceived absolute compensation differentials, although there may be
(unlike trade), significant non-economic reasons as well, such as familial ties and
affection. In the post-modern world of today, ethnic homogeneity is no longer a
defensible reason that can palatably be offered by the majority of lawmakers in
crafting immigration policy. Instead, public policy debates on immigration focus on
the deleterious economic effects (if any), of immigration, for example, upon natives'
jobs and wages, fiscal burdens upon the host state and occasionally, upon in-
creased criminal activity that may accompany an influx of foreigners. Racist and
religious resentment and exclusion of certain aliens has had a long history in the
United States. The literacy test requirement (passed by Congress in 1917, over
President Wilson's veto) was meant to slow down immigration form Eastern and
Southern Europe. The "inferiority" of the Mediterranean races was in fact, as-
sumed by the Dillingham Commission of 1910 that issued a 42-volume report. So-
cial and scientific Darwinism was in full flower in the United States at that time.
The Dillingham Commission Report and other scholars warned repeatedly against
the acceptance of "beaten members of beaten breeds." See, e.g., MALDWYN JONES,
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION (2d ed. Univ. Chicago Press 1992); JOHN HIGHAM, STRAN-
GERS IN THE LAND: PATTERS Or AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925 (2d ed. Rutgers
Univ. Press 1988).
77 For instance, it could be the case that the basic Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade,
infra part IV.B., is more suited to analysis of U.S. policy rather than that in the
European Union. This might be because labor markets in the U.S. are generally
viewed as being more flexible (i.e., more competitive) than those in Europe.
78 For example, entry quotas.
79 If successfully implemented through border interdictions or deportation.
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This occurs, both directly and indirectly, through "demonstration ef-
fects" on other would-be emigrants in the source country.
Similarly, trade liberalization increases the flows of imports
and exports with consequent effects upon domestic industries produc-
ing competing goods.8 0 When trade liberalization is too successful and
leads to large increases in imports, domestic producers in import-com-
peting industries may be expected to lobby legislators to restrict unfair
trade.8 1
Recognition of these types of feedback effects between policy
regimes and their effects has interested political scientists and public
choice theorists and will be discussed below.8 2 However, the concern
in this section is the feedback, or linkage, between trade flows and mi-
gration flows, known more generally as "factor flows." Specifically,
what is the effect of increased trade flows on incentives to migrate and,
conversely, the effect of factor flows (i.e., labor and capital flows) on
incentives to trade goods and services between countries? As indicated
previously, trade and migration may be conceptually viewed as substi-
tutes, if increased trade flows reduce incentives to migrate. (In other
words, trade in goods can take the place of movements of labor.) On
the other hand, when increased trade leads to more migration, trade
and migration can be said to be complement to each other.
B: Classic Vintage Models
What insights regarding the trade-migration relationship fol-
low from the simplest theoretical frameworks constructed by trade
scholars? Trade models of early vintage are unambiguous with respect
to their implications for the trade-migration relationship; trade in
goods is a substitute for migration of factors of production, such as
labor. s3
80 Domestic industries that compete with imports experience a double blow from
trade liberalization. First, cheaper imports threaten such industries directly. Sec-
ond, as domestic exports increase to supply the world market, wage rates begin to
rise across the entire economy, further squeezing the profit margins of import-
competing industries.
81 This phenomenon is precisely what is currently observed in the U.S. with re-
spect to its bilateral trade with China. A similar phenomenon and response is ob-
served with respect to outsourcing of high-tech services to India. See, e.g., India:
Back Office to the World, THE ECONOMIST, May 3, 2001; The Rise of Nearshoring,
THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2005 (discussing the recent phenomenon of outsourcing to
Eastern Europe).
82 Economic analysis, on the other hand, typically assumes that the policy stance
is given and fixed (i.e., exogenous).
83 Hence, the often repeated statement that a country can import goods or it can
import people, voluntarily or involuntarily. Authors writing in fields such as law,
political science, or sociology appear to have assumed that trade and migration are
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At the most elementary level, the raison d'tre for mutually
profitable trade opportunities, is the fact that countries (or areas) are
different in their comparative advantage in producing different goods
and services. Differences in comparative advantage manifest them-
selves in differences in relative prices of goods across countries if they
did not engage in free trade.8 4 A model, or theoretical construct, must
therefore explain the reason for differing relative prices of goods across
countries in the absence of trade.
Theoretical Considerations
Elementary trade theory identifies at least two such explana-
tions: one based upon technological differences (specifically, labor pro-
ductivity) between countries and the other upon different countries
natural endowments 5 of labor and capital. The latter model is the
usual workhorse of elementary trade theory. This framework - known
as the Heckscher-Ohlin model - assumes that countries are naturally
endowed with capital and labor in differing proportions. At the same
time, goods are distinct in their technological requirements of labor
and capital for production. A simple statement of the Heckscher-Ohlin
prediction of trade patterns is that countries will export those goods
that are relatively intensive in using the factors of production with
which they are generously endowed.8 6
inevitably substitutes. As seen below, the substitutability paradigm is only valid
in the most simple trade models of early vintage and both history and empirical
analysis appear to reject such a relationship. For a sample of legal scholars who
have perfunctorily assumed that trade and migration are inevitably substitutes,
see for example, Johnson, supra note 7; Acevedo & Espenshade, supra note 21.
See, e.g., James Hollifield, Migration, Trade and the Nation-State: The Myth of
Globalization, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 595, 597 ("[Clonventional eco-
nomic wisdom has it that in the long run, trade can substitute for migration."); M.
Jeanette Yakamavich, NAFTA on the Move: The United States and Mexico on a
Journey Toward Free Movement of Workers, 8 LAw & Bus. REV. AM. 463, 478
(2002) ("Economists point to the inescapable connection between trade and migra-
tion issues and question whether NAFTA states can sustain the tension between
free trade objectives and restrictionist immigration policies").
84 Thus, if there are two countries A and B, each capable of producing goods X and
Y, and if the relative price of X (compared with the price of good Y) were lower in
country A, then country A has a comparative advantage in producing good X,
while country B has a similar comparative advantage with respect to good Y. It is
logically impossible for any country to possess a comparative advantage in all
goods, and what matters for trade is the existence of a comparative advantage, not
an absolute advantage.
85 The term "natural endowments" refers to the existing relative stocks of capital,
labor or land in a given country.
86 For example, if country A is relatively well-endowed with capital compared to
country B and if good X requires capital intensive methods of production (in both
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Standard assumptions, such as perfect competition and con-
stant returns to scale, ensure that rates of return on labor and capital
(i.e., wage and rental rates) in the two countries are aligned with their
relative abundance. Thus, in country A, wage rates will be higher, as
it is labor-scarce. On the other hand, if labor is relatively abundant in
country B, then wage rates in that country would be low. The incen-
tives for the migration of production factors (labor and capital) are now
perfectly clear; unless wage and rental rates change, country A will
prove to be a magnet for immigrant labor from country B unless there
are effective restrictions on movements of labor.s7
The implications of this simple framework for trade liberaliza-
tion are well-known. If free trade (or increased trade) occurs between
countries A and B, country A expands its production of the capital-
intensive good X in which it possesses a comparative advantage, and
conversely, country B expands its production of good Y. Increased pro-
duction of the exportable good in each country is a natural conse-
quence of serving a larger world market rather than the home market
alone. Capital constraints and increasing marginal costs of production
ensure that the process of increased production for export lead to capi-
tal becoming more expensive in country A and labor more expensive in
country B. Thus, returns to capital rise in country A, while wage rates
decline in country B. This phenomenon is known as "factor price
equalization."
Implications for the Trade-Migration Relationship
The necessary implications for migration in the face of free
trade are now readily apparent; prices of factors (labor and capital) in
various countries start to converge, i.e., free trade dampens the incen-
tives to migrate. The push-pull factors leading to migration of labor
(and capital) are diluted. The same result would have occurred if, in-
stead of free trade in goods, a large amount of labor were allowed to
migrate from country B to A; relative wage rates in country A would
fall, and those in country B would rise. In this sense, trade in goods
and services works as a substitute for trade in labor and capital.
countries), then country A will have a comparative advantage in the production of
good X; country A will export good X and import good Y. This follows directly be-
cause good X will cost less in country A, compared to country B.
87 At the same time, capital is expected to flow from country A, where it is rela-
tively abundant, to country B. In reality, capital flows may require much more
supportive public infrastructure (such as assurances against expropriation, ade-
quately developed financial markets and freedom of repatriation of profits) than
the migration of labor; the latter is easily facilitated through the existence of pri-
vate infrastructure, such as migrant networks.
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Consistency with Observed Historical Patterns
Before discussing theoretical constructs, it is useful to inquire
if the traditional framework discussed above is consistent with the ob-
served pattern of European-U.S. migration in the late 19th century.
During this period, the United States may be regarded as being labor
scarce and land abundant. By contrast, the opposite configuration ex-
isted in Europe so that America would tend to be a magnet for labor
migration from Europe. At the same time, trade liberalization and/or
falling trade costs would, according to the basic model discussed above,
reduce the incentives for labor migration. In stark contrast to the pre-
dicted pattern, however, trade and labor flows into the United States
increased simultaneously over this period. The actual observed rela-
tionship was that of complementary, not substitute, flows of trade and
labor.
C: Extensions of the Basic Framework
Extensions of the simple framework discussed above have been
of at least two types. Early extensions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model
retained the basic assumption of competitive conditions in all markets
and focused on enriching the model by introducing the assumption
that labor and capital are specialized in their usefulness and produc-
tivity in different sectors or industries.8 8 More recent literature begin-
ning in the 1980s, has focused instead on relaxing the assumption of
perfect competition by permitting various types of market imperfec-
tions and distortions, including monopolistic competition, "prime
mover advantages," increasing returns to scale, as well as various re-
straints and imperfections in labor markets.8 9 In either case, the pre-
dicted theoretical relationship between trade and migration flows
becomes much richer and more complex and admits the possibility of
88 This is known as the specific factors model (i.e., factors of production are spe-
cific to certain sectors of the economy and not easily transferable across sectors or
industries). This formulation is commonly attributed to the seminal work of Ron-
ald Jones. See Ronald Jones, A Three-Factor Model in Theory, Trade and History,
in TRADE, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND GROWTH 3-5 (Jagdish Bhagwati ed., North
Holland 1971). Thus, for example, coal miners in Appalachia are not likely to be
productive as software developers in Silicon and the capital used in coal mines
(such as hydraulic lifts and forks) is not much use in the computer industry.
89 Much of the work in the context of increasing returns to scale and other exter-
nalities was pioneered by Krugman and Helpman. See, e.g., ELHANAN HELPMAN &
PAUL KRUGMAN, MARKET STRUCTURE AND FOREIGN TRADE: INCREASING RETURNS,
IMPERFECT COMPETITION, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 2-4, 34 (1985); PAUL
KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY AND TRADE 6-7 (1993).
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either substitutability or complementarity, depending upon empirical
parameters. 90
1: Extensions: Competitive Models
The specific or specialized factor model, as indicated above, re-
tains the basic assumption of full competition in product and factor
markets. In its simplest version, there are only two factors of produc-
tion, labor and capital, which are specialized by industry or sector. 9 1 A
result that follows from this framework is that the effects of trade lib-
eralization upon incentives to migrate are ambiguous and can be
shown to depend upon the effects of increased trade upon real wages of
labor. In turn, the effect upon real wages depends upon the weight of
importable goods in the consumption basket.92 It is quite possible
therefore, for trade and migration to be in a complementary relation-
ship in this framework, i.e. trade liberalization will be accompanied by
increased incentives for migration.
Further extensions of the specific factor framework in more re-
cent years yield similar, indeterminate results with respect to the
trade-migration relationship. Modifications to the basic framework to
account for factor specialization or specificity, in conjunction with the
incorporation of an additional input can alter the result as well. For
example, one can hypothesize the existence of three inputs, one of
which (capital) is inter-sectorally mobile, while the other inputs (labor)
are sector-specific (for example, in the traded and non-traded sectors).
It is also possible to incorporate the assumption that one type of labor
90 See note 60 supra, discussing the fact that scholars in fields other than econom-
ics have unfortunately not been careful to take account of the implications of work
in international trade theory beyond its elementary propositions.
91 Specialization in certain occupations or sectors is more likely to affect labor,
rather than capital. Harry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law
and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1333, 1358 (2006). Trade liberaliza-
tion inevitably causes the import-competing sector to shrink and the labor em-
ployed in that sector to be laid off. Jide 0. Nzelibe, Interest Groups, Power Politics,
and the Risks of WTO Mission Creep, 28 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 89, 92 (2004). It
is precisely the recognition of these adverse effects of trade upon certain types of
labor that is the basis of trade adjustment assistance programs in the U.S. The
current statute is the Trade Adjustment Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210,
116 Stat. 933 (2002) (codified 19 U.S.C 26). The Department of Labor, Manage-
ment Information Systems (DTAA MIS) reports that in 2004, 2918 petitions for
adjustment relief were received; of these 1734 were approved. U.S. TRADE REPRE-
SENTATIVE, TRADE ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES 253, 272 (2005) available at http://
www.ustr.gov/assets/document Library/ReportsPublications/2005/2005_Trade_
PolicyAgenda/asset-upload file_4317316.pdf.
92 Michael S. Knoll & Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxes
for Regional Living Costs and Amenities, 116 HARv. L. REV. 987, 1019 (2003).
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(such as highly skilled labor) is mobile across national borders. Models
of this type are capable of explaining emigration of skilled labor from
developing nations to rich countries following trade liberalization.93
This phenomenon has received enormous attention in the literature on
the "brain drain. 9 4
I turn next to a brief discussion of more recently developed
trade models and their possible implications for the trade-migration
relationship. As mentioned earlier, the more recent literature is char-
acterized by its attention to non-competitive features, such as monopo-
listic competition and increasing returns to scale.
93 An example of a specific factor that is internationally mobile could be highly
skilled information services workers or medical personnel. Anupam Chander,
Homeward Bound, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60, 67 (2006). U.S. immigration policy explic-
itly accounts for the importation of highly-trained labor, both as non-immigrants
or as permanent immigrants. Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policies: Messages of
Exclusion to African Americans, 37 How. L. J. 237, 266 (1994). For example, due
to a perceived shortage of nurses in the U.S., foreign nurses have been the benefi-
ciaries of special visa categories and other ad hoc legislation, such as the Nursing
Relief for Disadvantaged Areas Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-95, 113 Stat. 1312
(1999). Enid Trucios-Haynes, Temporary Workers and Future Immigration Policy
Conflicts: Protecting U.S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand for Global Human
Capital, 40 BRANDEIS L. J. 967, 996 (2002).
94 The literature on the "brain drain" is too extensive to be surveyed or extensively
referenced in this paper. The notion of the brain drain involves a paradoxical sub-
sidy from poorer to richer nations. Secondary and tertiary education in most devel-
oping countries is provided at public expense. To this extent, the public in these
countries has "invested" in training professionals and skilled workers, but the ben-
efits of the educational investment are only captured by the richer host countries.
At the same time, the latter countries also stand to gain expected tax revenues
when these professional workers commence employment in the host countries.
The early seminal work on the brain drain of Jagdish Bhagwati proposed a tax on
professionals emigrating from developing countries, in order to compensate the
latter. See TAXING THE BRAIN DRAIN: A PROPOSAL 3 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Martin
Partington eds., North Holland 1976). An offsetting factor might be the remit-
tances that immigrants (once settled in the host countries) transfer to relatives
left behind in the source country. See Dilip Ratha, World Bank, Workers' Remit-
tances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance, GLOBAL
DEV. FIN. 2003, ch. 7, 158 (2003). For a survey of the issues and the literature on
the brain drain, see Simon Commander et al, The Brain Drain, Curse or Boon? A
Survey of the Literature, in CHALLENGES TO GLOBALIZATION: ANALYZING THE Eco-
NOMICS 236 (Robert Baldwin & L. Alan Winters eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 2004);
Richard Adams Jr., International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain: A
Study of 24 Labor-Exporting Countries, World Bank Policy Research Paper No.
3069, 1 (2003). The drain of talent is by no means limited to scientific profession-
als. In addition, sports enthusiasts will no doubt note the presence of foreign ath-
letes in U.S. professional sports such as basketball and soccer.
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2: Extensions: Non-Competitive Models
A basic assumption of the classic trade framework outlined
above and its specific factor variants is that of perfect competition and
of constant returns to scale in all sectors. Starting in the 1980s, trade
economists began to construct models embodying increasing returns to
scale and/or monopolistic competition.9 5 While a survey of the rich re-
sults that may now emerge is beyond the scope of this paper, the fol-
lowing brief observations may be made. First, there are new forces at
work in determining wage and rental rates and thus on incentives to
migrate. More precisely, both absolute and relative factor endow-
ments matter in determining production costs and hence, comparative
advantage. Second, because of intra-industry trade and scale effects,
firms tend to locate in areas characterized by large expenditures. In
turn, this leads to an agglomeration effect, i.e. there are exploitable
gains from cumulatively moving factors of production and production
bases to the larger economy. Factor immobility in this context can im-
pede complete agglomeration, and can lead instead to accentuation of
differences between countries. Hence, the conclusion is that if country
size is allowed to feed into lower costs via increasing returns to scale,
then factor mobility can be destabilizing and can lead to concentration
of economic activity in one country called the "core," around which
there is a "periphery" of economic satellites. Trade liberalization in
such a context is accompanied by increased migration to the core coun-
try, i.e. trade and migration flows are complementary in nature. In
addition, these labor flows can include outflows of skilled labor from
skilled labor scarce areas, i.e. this framework is also fully capable of
generating an observed "brain drain."
In conclusion of this sub-section, it is seen that economic analy-
sis does not unequivocally pin down the direction of the trade-migra-
tion relationship. Early competitive models predict that the
relationship is of substitutability, but more complex structures can re-
sult in trade flows and migration being complements (as they were in
the nineteenth century). One may conjecture that models embodying
imperfect competition (characterized, for example by labor market ri-
gidities) may be more applicable to European economies than to the
United States. To this extent, the empirical researcher would be more
likely to discover a substitutability relationship between trade and mi-
gration in the U.S., rather than in the structurally more rigid econo-
mies of Europe.
95 See for example, HELPMAN AND KRUGMAN, supra note 89; James Markusen,
Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade 1 (MIT Press 2002).
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V: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVES
I have observed above that while both trade and labor econo-
mists have worked extensively on the consequences of expanding trade
and immigration respectively, there has been relatively little work in
the economics literature that has explicitly examined the trade-migra-
tion relationship. To this extent, the previous section was intended to
fill a gap in the literature. In the area of political economy (or its more
formal cousin, public choice), scholars have attempted to incorporate
non-economic factors, such as cultural and interest group preferences
or voter choices to explain (or endogenize) immigration policy and
trade policy. This is a step beyond that taken by economists, who gen-
erally assume that trade policy (for example, the level of tariffs or non-
tariff barriers) or immigration policy (for instance, the type and level
of entry restrictions imposed) is exogenous and fixed. The work of pub-
lic choice theorists is a valuable step forward in recognizing the mu-
tual feedback effects that exist between the policy stance and its
effects. For example, a given immigration policy (represented per-
haps, by numerical quotas or the degree of border enforcement) deter-
mines the extent of immigration inflows. However, at the same time,
as immigration flows proceed, newly arrived immigrants form coali-
tions, perhaps along with certain "natives," and in turn, such interest
groups may exert an effect upon future immigration policy. In similar
fashion, trade policy as represented by tariff levels or quantitative re-
strictions, determines the flows of imports and exports. Over time as
trade continues, import competing industries in the importing country
are adversely affected and often lobby for import restrictions in the
form of "safeguard measures" or anti-dumping duties etc.96 Thus,
while free trade may initially enjoy a broad consensus, "too much" suc-
cess in liberalizing trade erodes the initial consensus with calls for
protectionism.
While public choice theorists and political economists have in-
deed constructed models or frameworks to incorporate such feedback
effects, the trade-migration relationship has received very little, if any,
attention in this strand of the literature, just as with economic analy-
sis discussed in the previous section. For the most part, public choice
models that attempt to explain (or endogenize) trade policy or immi-
gration policy have developed separately, with the vast majority of
work in this area being devoted to frameworks that discuss and ana-
lyze the preferences of states and their constituent voters with respect
96 See supra note 92 for a discussion of trade adjustment relief petitions. The
term "safeguard measures" generically encompasses antidumping actions, 19
U.S.C. §§ 1671, Escape Clause actions, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and Unfair Trade ac-
tions under Section 301, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411.
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to immigration policy, rather than trade policy." I turn now to some
of the theses explaining individual and collective decisions regarding
migration in political choice frameworks and to the implications for
the trade-migration relationship that scan be fairly deduced from
these analyses.
As a starting point, it will first be recalled that archetypical
economic analyses of international migration is premised upon the ex-
istence of a large and attractive differential between expected earnings
prospects between the source and source countries. However, an ex-
clusive focus upon expected earnings differentials as the principal
driver of international migration is inadequate for the U.S., for at least
two reasons. First, only 20 percent or so, of the U.S. annual legal im-
migration quota is allocated to employment-based visas, with over 70
percent are allocated to family preferences. 98 Second, and more impor-
tantly, fluctuations in the real wage differential between the U.S. and
source country appear to be poorly correlated with the volumes of mi-
grant flows into the U.S. from such source countries. 99 This is true of
both, legal immigration and illegal immigration. Clearly, traditional
97 Perhaps this is so, because interest groups and voters may be more easily or-
ganized around visible and tangible symbols of integration in the form of immigra-
tion of persons, rather than the ubiquitous presence of foreign goods that are
consumed. Immigration of persons, their assimilation and political incorporation,
fits comfortably within the political economist's paradigm; issues relating to trade
in goods do not enjoy any such comfortable niche in the paradigmatic toolkit of
political economists and public choice theorists.
98 Under current immigration law, of the 675,000 annual limit of immigration into
the U.S., 480,000 visas are allocated to family preferences and 140,000 to employ-
ment visas. Myron N. Kramer, Immigration Selection System and Governing
Agencies Involving Immigration, SC38 A.L.I. 1, 3 (1998). Actual entrants into the
U.S. exceed this total number, since "immediate relatives" are exempt from the
quotas. Michael Maggio, Larry S. Rifkin & Sheila T. Starkey, Immigration Fun-
damentals for International Lawyers, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 857, 877 (1998). On
the other hand, the U.S. system is dichotomous; an alien may be admitted under a
family preference or under an employment-based preference. By contrast, Austra-
lia, Canada and the United Kingdom each employ a "points-based" system, which
allows consideration of both familial ties and work skills in determining immigra-
tion eligibility. See for example, Mary Crock, Contract or Compact: Skilled Migra-
tion and the Dictates of Politics and Ideology, 16 GEO. IMMGR. L.J. 133, 144
(2001) (discussing Australian immigration policy) and NINETTEE KELLEY AND
MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, THE MAKING OF THE MOSAIC: A HISTORY OF CANADIAN IMMI-
GRATION POLICY 348-349 (University of Toronto Press 1998).
99 It has been noted, for example, that during the 1980s, U.S. unemployment was
on the increase and U.S. real wages declining, while in Mexico, opposite trends
were at work. Nevertheless, Mexican migration to the U.S. increased sharply dur-
ing this period. See Douglas Massey & Felicia Garcia Espana, The Social Process
of International Migration, 237 SCIENCE 733 (1987).
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economic analysis could benefit by incorporating additional factors
such as socio-political and other considerations as determinants of mi-
gration. Recent work has focused precisely on such extensions. 100
A: Non-Economic Factors Bearing Upon Migration: Relative
Deprivation
One of the recent, sophisticated attempts to incorporate extra-
economic factors in the analysis of international migration at the level
of the individual is by Stark and Taylor (1991).101 Building on early
work by Stark in the context of rural-urban migration in an economy
internally, Stark and Taylor postulate that the incentives that matter
for migration are not so much the disparity in domestic and foreign
wages, but an individual or household's perception of relative depriva-
tion (i.e. a "peer reference effect") in an appropriate reference group or
socio-economic class.10 2 In the context of international migration, the
relative deprivation hypothesis assumes special importance and can
lead to results that are quite different from those that emerge from
simpler economic frameworks. Relative deprivation is defined in
terms of one's perceived standing in a chosen reference group (for ex-
ample, the local village or community). Households are risk-averse
and seek to diversify risks, as well as, improve their lot in the relevant
reference group. This could be achieved by permitting or encouraging
some, but not all, working family members to emigrate to seek greener
pastures elsewhere, while pooling risks by retaining a core base at
home.
Moreover, and more interestingly, the reference group is not a
static concept. For example, the reference group (with respect to
which the relative deprivation is defined), may be the local community
or village to start with, but it is quite possible that owing to "demon-
stration effects," the reference group may change to encompass com-
100 For example, recent work in sociology and anthropology has attempted to in-
troduce quantitative proxies for social networks in estimating migration probabili-
ties. This body of work is concerned in the main, with the causes of immigration
decisions made at the individual level. By contrast, political economy or public
choice analyses have concerned themselves with the state's choice of immigration
policy. See infra Section VI.
101 Oded Stark & J. Edward Taylor, Migration Incentives, Migration Types: The
Role of Relative Deprivation, 101 EcON. J. 1163, 1178 (1991).
102 Previous work on internal migration in a country has focused on absolute dif-
ferentials in wage levels across the rural and urban sectors, costs of migration,
probability of securing an urban job etc. These factors may be summarized as
differentials in the present value of expected incomes in the rural and urban sec-
tors respectively. See also supra note 47.
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munities in the host country, rather than the country of origin."°3 In
such a case, relative deprivation increases as migration proceeds, lead-
ing to even more migration. Thus, immigration into the host country
gathers its own momentum, which may be quite independent of the
initial conditions that motivated early migration. In addition, the pro-
gressive development and deepening of social and kinship networks
adds to this cumulative process. 10 4
In the international context, the substitutability of reference
groups may be more limited than initially supposed, because interna-
tional dissimilarities may be much greater and "mental" migration is
much more difficult than across sectors internally in a country. Dis-
continuities in labor markets and the socio-cultural environment will
therefore temper the role of relative deprivation when considering in-
ternational migration. This may be especially so in the case of illegal
migration and as some authors have pointed out, the possibility of de-
tection and deportation greatly lowers the rate of return to human cap-
ital investment by the illegal entrant. This explains why
undocumented aliens remit earnings to the home country in large
amounts, and remain at their original skill levels, rather than engag-
ing in formal vocational or other training, even when they are not re-
source-constrained. ' 0 5
Empirical tests of the relative deprivation hypothesis in the
context of Mexican migration to the U.S. generally validate the hy-
103 In more concrete terms, in the case of Mexico to U.S. migration, the initial
reference group may be the local community in Mexico of the would-be emigrant.
Over time, as more Mexicans leave their villages to join communities in the U.S.
(and if they are adequately assimilated), the reference group for the households of
the Mexican emigrants might well include members of the local community in the
U.S. This is so, as the recently-arrived immigrants begin to mentally identify with
and "compete" with their new geographical neighbors. This phenomenon is
termed "reference group substitution." See Stark & Taylor, supra note 101, at
1166.
104 U.S. immigration law formally permits "chain migration" through its emphasis
on family reunification. Thus, an initial immigrant into the U.S. may be accompa-
nied by his/her spouse and minor children, all as permanent residents. In time, if
both the husband and wife naturalize, they may each petition for permanent resi-
dent status for their respective siblings.
105 In addition, in the U.S. at least, there are a host of barriers imposed by immi-
gration regulations that limit schooling opportunities for undocumented residents.
Children of undocumented aliens may not be denied free basic public school educa-
tion under the Plyler decision. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Plyler did not
address the provision of post-secondary (high school) education, which is left up to
the states. No federal law prohibits undocumented aliens from attending public or
private colleges or universities. However, accredited public and private institu-
tions are required to verify the visa status of an alien, and generally, only holders
of valid student visas may attend U.S. schools on a full-time basis.
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pothesis. 116 The tests also establish several interesting findings that
are consistent with the hypothesis. First, the effects of relative depri-
vation upon international migration are not the same across all in-
come points of the sending household. The poorest village households,
being occupied with subsistence concerns, are not emigrant units.
Emigrants originate from middle-income households.1 °7 Second, the
overwhelming majority of immigrants from Mexico to the U.S. origi-
nate in households with other adult members in the unit or village,
who remain behind. This is consistent with risk-pooling for the village
unit. Finally, households with kinship networks already in place in
the U.S. are more likely to send additional members to the U.S. In the
context of framework discussed above, the existence of social or kin-
ship networks reduces the risks of migration and may also, facilitate
speedier reference group substitution. In both instances, initial emi-
gration can be self-propelling.
What implications follow for the trade migration relationship
in the context of the relative deprivation framework? The cumulative
effects of increased migration feeding upon increased relative depriva-
tion and yet more migration, may be of importance in deducing the
relationship of these factors to international trade. It may well be the
case that the strength of the migration-relative deprivation effects,
which generate self-propelling migration, are sufficient to overwhelm
the tendency of trade and migration to be substitutes, even in the sim-
plest economic models discussed previously. To my knowledge how-
ever, no one has formally demonstrated this proposition to date and
this work is to be regarded at present, as unfinished business.
B: Interest Groups
The relative deprivation and relative wage differential hypoth-
eses discussed above, focus on the self-interest of the emigrant decision
unit. If emigration appears to be a "winning proposition", potential
migrants uproot themselves and absorb the risks of departure and as-
similation in the host country. However, there are winners and losers
in the host country as well. On a basic economic level, the proximate
losers in the host country are other (usually unskilled or semi-skilled)
workers who must now compete with undocumented workers with far
lower wage expectations. Liberalized trade with the source country
would have initially displaced workers in the import-competing indus-
tries in the host country in the same manner. On the other hand, cer-
tain sectors in the host country benefit both from legal and illegal
106 Stark & Taylor, supra note 101, at 1177.
107 Households with very high incomes are also not likely to be sending units, as
members of such households can enjoy a comfortable existence at home, without
assuming the risks of international migration.
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immigration as well as from trade liberalization. Thus, the exportable
industry in the liberalizing country will expand to meet greater world
demand and will generally present more favorable wage and employ-
ment conditions. Similarly, certain host country employers may stand
to benefit from clandestine hiring of low-wage undocumented aliens.
Interest group analysis in public choice theory seeks to identify
the self-interests of various groups in society. Because interest groups
are free to engage in political lobbying under a democratic franchise,
the ultimate immigration and trade policies adopted by the state will
be the result of a political contest (or a "repeated game") between vari-
ous factions. I turn now to this strand of the literature, especially with
regard to immigration policy.
The introduction of interest group considerations to explain the
distinctive features of nineteenth century immigration policy in Eu-
rope and the New World yields some useful insights1 0 8 The key ques-
tions in this context are: who gains and who loses from immigration,
and who is in a position to affect immigration policy? Later work along
these lines has built on interest group analysis by constructing a me-
dian voter model to capture the preferences of the average citizen. 10 9
During most of the nineteenth century, European migration
into the New World (both North and South America) was encouraged
by the host countries. Purely economic or sociological explanations are
inadequate to explain the observed variations in patterns of immigra-
tion. For example, race-based explanations played a role, and may ex-
plain the restriction of Asian migrants to tropical areas in which the
Europeans had no interest in settling. However, the range of immigra-
tion policies pursued by host countries (as between North and South
America, for example) is not capable of being explained solely by racial
108 See James Foreman-Peck, A Political Economy Model of International Migra-
tion 1815-1914, LX MANCHESTER SCH. 359, No. 4, Dec. 1992.
109 The median voter model has a long and venerable vintage in political choice
theory and is the simplest model of majoritarian decision-making. Social decision-
making rules seek to "aggregate" or somehow account for preferences of individu-
als, in constructing group decision rule. The majority voting rule necessarily ac-
counts for the preferences of all members. There was no clear exposition of the
median Voter theorem until the work of Duncan Black and its extension thereaf-
ter, to representative democracies by Anthony Downs. See generally Duncan
Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making 56 J. POL. ECON. 23 (1948);
ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (Harper & Row 1957).
Black's work was shortly followed by the seminal demonstration of the "impossibil-
ity theorem" by Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow. See generally KENNETH J. AR-
ROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed., 1963). The seminal work of
Buchanan and his colleagues in this area should also be noted. See generally
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (Univ. of Michigan Press 1962).
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or ethnic preferences.1 1 ° Similarly, economic factors alone, such as
wage differentials, do not explain the inflow into the Americas. Eco-
nomic historians have demonstrated that despite steadily eroding
wage differentials between Europe and North America, immigration
into the latter continued unabated, and, in fact, may have accelerated
during the latter part of the nineteenth century.1 1 Clearly, neither
race relations nor economic theory alone is capable of reconciliation
with observed historical reality.
Interest groups in such a framework are broadly configured as
landowners and owners of labor. Self-interest dictates that factory
owners seek to prevent reduction of returns to that input (through de-
mand side considerations or increases in the supply of that input).
Therefore, input owners (i.e. owners of capital and labor) generally
prefer policies that expand the supply of other inputs, which may
cause a re-distribution of national income to the former. Thus, capital
owners would prefer, ceteris paribus, to see an increase in the supply of
labor as this raises the relative returns to capital and alters income
distribution in favor of capital. 1 2 A pro-labor state would protect la-
bor income, which in turn would require emigration and/or discourag-
ing immigration of labor with similar skills. 3 On the other hand, a
landowner-influenced state would clearly encourage immigration,
since this has at least two beneficial effects for the landowner. First,
immigration holds down labor wages. Second, relative scarcity of land
and a greater labor force results in a larger portion of national income
accruing to landowners as rents.
The next key link in the framework is to specify the nature of
the policy-maker. Under a true democratic franchise, national policies
with respect to immigration would be determined by the number of
electors that were landowners or labor owners. However, fully demo-
cratic franchises were scarce in the nineteenth century, given the lim-
ited existence of elected institutions.114 Most constitutions (to the
extent they existed) were effectively controlled by the wealthy, who
110 For example, Canada initially pursued less favorable immigration polices than
did Argentina. See generally, KELLEY & TREBILCOCK, supra note 98; DONALD S.
CASTRO, THE DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICS OF ARGENTINE IMMIGRATION POLICY
1852-1914: To GOVERN IS TO POPULATE (Mellen Research Univ. Press 1991).
"I See, e.g., WILLIAMSON & O'RouRKE, supra note 56.
112 See generally, William F. Shughart II et al., The Political Economy of Immigra-
tion Restrictions, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 79 (1986) (examining immigration policy using
the interest group theory).
113 See F. H. Buckley, The Political Economy of Immigration Policies, 16 INT'L
REV. L. & ECON. 81, 96-97 (1996) (citing VERNON M. BRIGGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE 22-49 (John Hopkins Univ. Press 1984)).
114 Cf Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Jus-
tice, 117 HARV. L. REV. 761, 770-71 (2004) (citing SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE
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were predominantly landed gentry, or by monarchies that had little
interest in wage incomes of commoners. Thus, when land ownership
and political control are tightly concentrated, an increase in the scar-
city of labor relative to land (resulting from expanding frontiers both
in North and South America) leads the landowner-controlled govern-
ment to encourage immigration, either by directly subsidizing immi-
gration or immigrant travel, or by recognizing indenture contracts
(such as serfdom and its more odious variations).1 1 5 Treaty obliga-
tions or colonial concerns may cause variations in the policies actually
adopted. For instance, empire-building might be a strong concern that
places a premium on cultural homogeneity and fealty to the colonial
monarch, thereby imposing a selection bias on would-be
immigrants. 116
For international migration to take place, accommodating poli-
cies must be in place in both the sending and receiving countries. As
indicated previously, nineteenth century European countries and the
Americas were likely both dominated by powerful landed interests.
Such interests would actively encourage immigration into the Ameri-
cas, but the source states in Europe would generally discourage emi-
THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY 16-17 (Univ.
Okla. Press 1991).
115 Cf Hadley Blake, Guess Who's Coming to Dinner: Federal Disaster Relief for
Undocumented Aliens, 48 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 217, 217 (1995) (citing
KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR: 1820-1924 at
1 (Academic Press 1984)). Another variation of this theme is that the host country
may welcome low skill immigrants in order to place them in occupations with little
job security. As a result, the overall labor market is more flexible and in a reces-
sion, the disenfranchised can easily be "dumped" without political cost. See Lamar
Smith & Edward R. Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking the Right Reasons, 28 ST.
MARY's L.J. 883, 922-23 (1997).
116 For example, immigrants from the former French colony of Algeria, on whom
"French culture, education, and political institutions" had been imposed, were ad-
mitted to France on more liberal terms than those from other areas during the
period up to and following The Evian Accords of 1962, which ended French coloni-
zation of Algeria and allowed Algerians to freely immigrate to France. However,
as later generations evinced more of their Algerian culture and beliefs, France's
immigration policy became more restrictive. Richard Klein, Immigration Laws as
Instruments of Discrimination: Legislation Designed to Limit Chinese Immigration
into the United Kingdom, 7 ToURO INT'L L. REV. 1, 6-10 (1997). Similarly, colonial
subjects , "to the extent they had the economic means, could, for the most part,
travel to and from Britain as they desired." Devon W. Carbado, Motherhood and
Work in Cultural Context: One Woman's Patriarchal Bargain, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 1, 6 (1998) (citing British Nationality Act, (1948) 11 Geo. 6, c. 56 (Eng.)).
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gration in order to prevent local wage rates from rising."' An
abundance of labor in the Old World however, effectively constrained
wages anyway, and no country in Europe adopted policies to seriously
stem the flow of labor to the Americas. During the nineteenth century,
most European countries refused to recognize a citizen's naturaliza-
tion in the Americas."18
This framework of interest-group coalitions corresponds well
with observed immigration policy in the New World. For example,
land-owning oligarchies in Argentina and Brazil actively supported
immigrant travel subsidies as the frontiers opened and the effective
supply of land expanded." 9 Political scientists have observed, how-
ever, that U.S. immigration policy is not quite consistent with the pro-
posed interest group analysis.' 2 ° By approximately 1890, the U.S.
western frontier was closing, leading one to suppose that this period
would mark the beginning of immigrant controls.' 2 ' Although there
had been isolated pieces of U.S. legislation directed at certain types of
immigrants, no general U.S. restriction was enacted until the 1921
Quota Act. In part, the continuing openness of the U.S. economy could
be due to the fact that European immigrants possessed a different
portfolio of skills than native labor in the U.S., and were therefore,
complementary to domestic labor, instead of being substitutable. If so,
domestic labor, enfranchised or not, would have benefited along with
landowners from continued European immigration. Examination of
U.S. Census data for occupational and industry groups appears to sup-
port this complimentary hypothesis. 122
117 Cf. Myron Weiner, Migration and State Response: A Security Perspective on
International Migration, 20 FLETCHER FORUM WORLD AFF. 17, 30-31 (1996) (as-
serting that when wages rise, emigration pressures decrease).11s David Fitzgerald, Rethinking Emigrant Citizenship, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 90, 92
(2006).
119 Cf Marvin H. Morse & Lucy M. Moran, Troubling the Waters: Human Cargos,
33 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 1, 27 n.142 (2002) (citing ALAN M. KRAuT, THE HUDDLED
MASSES: THE IMMIGRANT IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 1880-1921, at 10-11 (Harlan David-
son, 2nd ed. 2001) (1982)).120 Foreman-Peck, supra note 108.
121 See Shannon Roesler, Who are "We the People"?: The Legal Response to Twenti-
eth-Century Migration in Germany and the United States, 1 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 92, (2001) (citing Gerald L. Neuman, "We are the People": Alien Suffrage
in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 259, 299-300 (1992)).
122 See generally Stephen Nicholas & Peter R. Shergold, Intercountry Labour Mo-
bility During the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Australian Transportation
Records, 39 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 624 (1987); Peter R. Shergold, Relative Skill
and Income Levels of Natives and Foreign Born Workers: A Re-examination, 13
EXPLORATIONS IN ECON. HIST. 451 (1976); Barry Eichengreen & Henry A. Gemery,
The Earnings of Skilled and Unskilled Immigrants at the End of the Nineteenth
Century, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 441 (1986).
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What are the implications of the interest-group public choice
framework for the trade-migration relationship, which is the focus of
this paper? Most migration that occurred in the nineteenth century
was between Europe and the New World, i.e. areas that already partic-
ipated in substantial international trade. 123 In such circumstances,
movement of goods and of factors of production (labor and capital), are
substitutes, and the introduction of public choice considerations does
not materially affect the predictions of the basic framework discussed
earlier. As long as trading economies have access to similar technolo-
gies, more migration is likely to reduce comparative advantage, and
therefore reduce the exports of capital-intensive goods from the host
country of migrants. As this proceeds, wages and rents in the host and
source countries tend to equalize, aside from transport costs and tar-
iffs. Immigration controls alone would be ineffective in protecting la-
bor incomes, regardless of the preferences of ruling government.
Higher tariffs would also be necessary to protect wages. 12 4 Hence, the
implications of the basic framework discussed in Section IV (that is,
trade and migration are substitutes) are not fundamentally altered
with the introduction of public choice considerations along these lines.
C: The Median Voter
A framework such as the one described above, with broadly-
configured interest groups may be quite suitable to the prototypical
nineteenth-century government. With wider democratic enfranchise-
ment in the first half of the twentieth century, following the end of
monarchial rule in several European states, a framework in which the
state is more responsive to the average or median voter is desirable.
The median voter model is such a construct, and has been applied to
determining immigration policy. 125 The starting point is the observa-
tion that both immigrants and natives are heterogeneously endowed
with labor skills and capital. Natives choose immigration policy by
means of majority voting. While cultural and ethnocentric preferences
123 See Bill Ong Hing, Beyond the Rhetoric of Assimilation and Cultural Plural-
ism: Addressing the Tension of Separatism and Conflict in an Immigration-Driven
Multiracial Society, 81 CAL. L. REV. 863 app. 918 (1993) (citing EDWARD P. HUTCH-
INSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798-1965 at 483-
84 (Univ. Pa. Press 1981)).
124 As is well-known, the U.S. did increase tariffs sharply at the onset of the Great
Depression in 1930 by enacting the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. More than sixty U.S.
trade partners retaliated with like increases in their tariffs upon U.S. goods, lead-
ing to a precipitous decline in worldwide trade. See John Linarelli, International
Trade Relations and Separation of Powers Under the United States Constitution,
13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 203, 210-11 (1995).
125 See Jess Benhabib, On the Political Economy of Immigration, 40 EUR. ECON.
REV. 1737, 1737-43 (1996).
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are no doubt important in determining individuals' voting behavior,
the framework focuses solely on economic well-being as measured by
income. The framework produces the interesting implication that with
majority voting and heterogeneous labor and capital skills, the native
population will be polarized between those who favor and those who
oppose free skilled labor immigration. 2 6 In an economy with a
highly-skilled labor force, such as the United States, the median voter
prefers selective immigration of low-skilled labor (possibly including
undocumented aliens) that does not compete in the domestic labor
market with natives. 12 7
There are a number of possible extensions of this median voter
framework that may be of interest, but have yet to be pursued. First,
newly-arrived immigrants tend to specialize both in destination choice
and in occupational choice, i.e. they do not compete with native labor
in many sectors of the host economy. In fact, field studies conducted
by sociologists, anthropologists and other social scientists indicate that
such immigrants often concentrate in certain niche sectors of the host
economy and in certain occupational and geographical areas, relying
on and reinforcing existing social networks. If so, the native voter's
preferences may not be quite as polarized as suggested by the basic
framework. Next, natives' preferences for future immigrants could be
defined over both the mix of labor skills and capital endowments of
prospective immigrants, as well as, overall numerical limits (i.e. quo-
tas). Voting on the volume of immigrants, as well as, the skills set of
immigrants would require the incorporation of a rationing mechanism.
In particular, quotas on future immigrant admissions may be diverse
as to family-based and employment based immigration, as is the case
in the U.S. A framework incorporating tastes or preferences for vari-
ous classes of immigrants (such as relatives and employees) in the con-
text of voting by the median voter has yet to be developed.
Finally, the framework incorporates only one-shot choices (or
referendums). Over time, as immigrants become settled in, many ac-
quire voting rights through naturalization and the nature of the native
median voter must be re-defined. This dynamic process of transforma-
126 See Claudia Goldin, The Political Economy of Immigration Restrictions in the
United States 1890-1921 25-26, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 4345, (1993).
127 This result is not inconsistent with the preference of business employers in
developed nations to import highly-skilled labor, for example, through specialty
visas or a "points" system of immigration. When there is a shortage of such skilled
workers in the native labor force, the median voter in the receiving country is not
threatened by immigration of skilled labor. The model and its results are also con-
sistent with the median voter's preference to tolerate unskilled labor immigration,
including undocumented aliens in certain sectors of the economy. See also infra
Part V.D.
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tion of the median voter over time, through political incorporation in
the host state, as well as, socio-economic, linguistic, culinary and cul-
tural assimilation is the life-blood of work on immigration by anthro-
pologists, sociologists and ethnicity/race scholars. Again however, the
formal referendum (median voter) model of the public choice scholar
has not, to my knowledge, been incorporated in existing work on immi-
grant assimilation by researchers in other areas.
Simple as this framework may be, it is a useful advance over
existing literature in explicitly incorporating voter preferences and in
marrying at least two disciplines (i.e. economics and public choice). It
also provides the easily verifiable implication that the native popula-
tion will be sharply divided in its immigration preferences. In fact,
some natives may benefit from future illegal immigration of low-
skilled labor. The illegality permits selective enforcement of restric-
tive immigration laws that confine illegal immigrants to employment
in sectors where the median voter benefits from the immigrants' pres-
ence. In effect, immigrants are transformed form mobile factors of pro-
duction who might compete in domestic labor markets with the
median voter, to sector-specific factors of production whose presence is
beneficial to the median voter. Examples include domestic housework,
child care, farm work, work in food processing, the textile industry,
elder care (in Israel in particular), and bar hostess jobs (in Japan), to
name a few. Some recent evidence indicates that in the U.S., illegally
present Mexicans are seven times more likely to be apprehended at
work in manufacturing industries than in agriculture, while appre-
hension in the service sector is even more rare than in agriculture. 12s
There is plainly selective official tolerance of undocumented aliens as
manifested by the above examples and by the resources allocated to
enforcement. 129
128 See Alberto D6vila & Joso A. Pagdn, The Effectiveness of Selective INS Moni-
toring Strategies on the Industrial Employment Choice and Earnings of Recent Im-
migrants, 35 ECON. INQUIRY 138, 141 (1997).
129 In the U.S., no search warrants are needed to conduct immigration workplace
raids (under the "special needs" exception for warrantless searches for purposes of
the Fourth Amendment), except for raids on agricultural farms. For the warrant
requirement to conduct immigration workplace raids upon agricultural operations,
see 8 U.S.C. § 1357(e) (2000). Apart from farms, enforcement can be lax on other
sectors of the economy where there is a labor shortage, for example, meat-packing,
domestic help, housekeeping, restaurants, etc. The availability of low-cost un-
documented aliens in these sectors benefits both the median consumer and busi-
ness interests in these sectors. Enforcement activities of immigration officials in
the U.S. are reported in the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics (Department of
Homeland Security). OFFICE OF IMMIG. STAT., 2003 Y.B. OF IMMIGR. STAT. 144-52
(2004), available at http://149.101.23.2/graphics/shared/statistics/archives/in-
dex.htm. The 2003 Yearbook reports that cases completed for Employer Investiga-
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D: Can The Median Voter Prefer Selective Illegal Immigration?
The incorporation of officially tolerated illegal immigration, in
conjunction with legal immigration in a formal framework has been a
fruitful line of research that has been recently pursued.130 While ille-
gal workers can be implicitly accommodated in the simple median
voter framework described above, more recent analysis explicitly al-
lows for the existence of illegally present labor along with legally resi-
dent labor. The latter are in the majority and are assumed to be
mobile across sectors (as is capital). On the other hand, selective en-
forcement of immigration laws ensures that illegal workers can be con-
fined to certain sectors and are therefore, occupationally immobile.' 3 '
The analysis demonstrates that the attitude of the median voter (who
represents the legal majority) depends upon initial conditions. If little
or no undocumented aliens are initially present, the median voter op-
poses all immigration, legal or not. When undocumented aliens are
already present, however, voters may hypothetically elect between va-
rious alternatives: an amnesty for current illegal workers with no fur-
ther immigration of any type, permit illegal aliens to remain without
an amnesty (i.e. permissible illegal immigration), a ban on all future
immigration, mass expulsion of all currently present illegal workers,
and permit illegal workers to remain without an amnesty and permit
still more illegal immigration through imperfect border and interior
enforcement. It turns out that the policy choice that commands major-
ity support in any pair-wise referendum is the last one, permitting ille-
gal workers to remain in the host country without legalization and
furthermore, permitting additional limited illegal immigration.
Upon reflection, it should be clear that this outcome of a hypo-
thetical referendum vote is not without intuitive basis. If illegal work-
ers can be confined to certain sectors of the economy in which they do
not compete with resident labor, the effect upon the latter's wages will
be small. At the same time, the work performed by illegal immigrants
is complementary to that of legal workers. Voters still prefer to retain
illegal immigrants in a state of unamnestied limbo, in order to assure
confinement to desired sectors upon pain of apprehension and possible
deportation. The fact that illegal workers may be found in large num-
tions (which include workplace raids) declined from 7,537 in 1997 to 2,194 in 2003
(with a low of 1,595 in 2001). Workplace arrests declined even more sharply over
the same period, from 17,554 in 1997 to just 445 in 2003. Id. at 157.
130 See, e.g., Arye L. Hillman & Avi Weiss, A Theory of Permissible Legal Immigra-
tion, 15 EUR. J. POL. ECON.585 (1999).
131 In the U.S., the 1-9 employer verification system of lawful work status imple-
ments the occupational immobility by regulation. The 1-9 verification and em-
ployer sanctions were added to U.S. immigration law by the 1986 IRCA reforms.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2 (2006).
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bers, particularly in service sectors in several countries, i.e. sectors
that produce non-traded goods, can also be rationalized. Most illegal
immigrants have low incomes and their propensity to consume ser-
vices such as restaurant services, cleaning services on their own is lim-
ited, if not non-existent. When illegal workers proliferate in the non-
traded goods sector and add to output in that sector without consum-
ing any of the latter's output, relative prices of non-traded goods fall,
benefiting enfranchised legal voters. Finally, guest-workers (Gas-
tarbeiter) or temporary specialized workers can be comfortably accom-
modated in such a framework. While guest- workers are lawfully
present, they are usually confined to certain occupations and sectors
under the terms of their temporary visas.' 3 2
E: Can Public Choice or Game Theoretic Considerations Explain
Immigration Quotas?
In previous sections of this paper, I have referred, at several
points, to the existence of statutory immigration quotas for lawful im-
migrants. But what determines the quota limits set by legislatures or
by the executive branch (as is the case in Australia and Canada)? The
current U.S. immigration quota limits were established more than a
decade ago. In some cases, annual allotments of immigrants have
been adjusted on an ad hoc basis by Congress for humanitarian pur-
poses or to meet temporary personnel shortfalls. Formal analysis of
quota levels in the public choice literature is extremely recent and
utilizes game theory. The use of game theory in applications to the
law is neither new nor controversial by any means. Specifically, game-
theoretic analysis has been utilized in the areas of bankruptcy, trade
negotiations, antitrust, conflict resolution, litigation strategies and in
international political economy. 13 3 The game-theoretic model posits
that immigration quotas are determined as the result of a lobbying
contest between concerned parties. Such a framework is an extension
of the median voter model discussed previously in that the latter does
not allow for intensity of preferences to be registered, as is true of most
voting models. By contrast, in a costly lobbying contest, the magni-
132 The guest worker program began on a significant scale in the U.S. with the
Bracero Program in the U.S. that extended over 1942-1964 and permitted agricul-
tural workers in Mexico to temporarily work in the U.S. agricultural sector. Many
scholars believe that the network links that the Braceros established during this
period of sojourning established the foundation for future clandestine immigration
into the U.S. For example, Germany began its Gastarbeiter and Fremdarbeiter
programs by signing a Bilateral Recruitment Agreement with Italy in 1955. Simi-
lar articulation agreements were subsequently executed with Spain, and Greece in
1960 and then with Turkey in 1961.
133 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND THE LAW (Harvard University Press 1995).
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tude of resources devoted to lobbying can proxy the intensity of the
participant's preference for a specific outcome.
Participants in the contest naturally comprise coalitions of in-
terest groups with potentially competing views, such as firms and la-
bor unions. One simple approach is to focus on immigrant quotas in
the context of an all-pay (winner-take-all) contest between these inter-
est groups.' 34 The participant with the highest expenditures on the
lobbying contest wins the game as to the ultimate quota amount. Be-
cause neither party is aware ex ante, of the other's likely expenditure
on the contest and expenditures must be pre-committed, players must
choose their pay strategies without knowledge of the opponent's
counter-strategy. The game is solved backwards in two stages, as is
standard in such models. First, the union and the firm bargain over
the optimal immigration quota. Once this amount is known, the politi-
cal lobbying sub-game is solved in the second stage. The framework
produces some interesting results. For example, the larger the labor
union size, the smaller the expected immigration quota. It would be
straightforward and of interest to empirically test this proposition, but
as yet, there has been no such attempt. Two other results are of inter-
est. First, immigration quotas are correlated with the stage of the bus-
iness cycle in that during boom times, such quotas will increase. 135
Second, during periods of relative economic slumps in sending coun-
tries, the asking wage ("reservation wage") of immigrants decline,
leading to an increase in expected immigration quotas. It should be
noted however, that this framework is static. Over time, immigrants
may join labor unions or form coalitions with firms. Extensions along
these lines have yet to be pursued.
But, what of trade in good and services and its relationship
with the many aspects of migration discussed above? As with interest
group analysis, the median voter framework and its game-theoretic ex-
tensions discussed in this section have not been extended to explicitly
incorporate trade in goods and services. Nevertheless, a few general
observations are possible. Unlike immigration, which can be described
as discrete and "lumpy", trade flows are continuous in nature. In the
context of the simple competitive models discussed earlier, free trade
leads to a convergence in factor prices. Thus, the disparity between
wage rates of native and immigrant labor tends to become eroded, as
discussed earlier. In turn, this has implications for the preferences of
native labor and for the results of the "referendum" vote on future im-
migration. In particular, as wage and rental rates across natives and
134 J. Atsu Amegsahie, A Political Economy Model of Immigration Quotas, 5
ECON. GOVERNANCE 255 (2004).
135 See William F. Shugart, Robert D. Tollison & Mwangi S. Kimenyi, The Politi-
cal Economy of Immigration Restriction 4 YALE J. ON REG. 79, 97 (1986).
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prospective immigrants converge, voters become less polarized with
respect to their preferences regarding immigration policy. This im-
plies that the engine that drives immigration policy (i.e. diverse voter
preferences) must slow down. In this sense, trade flows may eliminate
or reduce the alternative basis for immigration that is based upon
preferences of natives, i.e., over time, "substitution effects" between
trade and immigration policy once again begin to emerge. It should be
noted however, that this inference is limited to the basic trade model
discussed previously.
The implications of marrying endogenous immigration prefer-
ences relating to amnesties, permissible illegality or quotas with more
complex models of trade, such as those incorporating either strategic
trade or monopolistic competition are at present, as entirely uncharted
territory.
VI: OTHER APPROACHES: SOCIOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
In this section I draw upon literature in law, sociology, anthro-
pology, demography, international political economy and international
relations with regard to migration and trade. Until very recently,
there was very little inter-disciplinary pollination in the work of soci-
ologists, demographers, international relations theorists and
economists. 136
A: Areas Commonly Examined in Various Disciplines:
Traditionally, sociologists working in the area of migration fo-
cus on assimilation of foreigners into the host society, as well as re-
lated issues of segregation and marginalization. Anthropologists have
examined the links and networks retained between immigrants and
their countries of origin. The recent immigration reforms in many
Latin American countries that permit dual citizenship with the U.S.
have strengthened those links.1 3 7 Some countries, such as Mexico and
the Dominican Republic, now even permit their expatriates to vote in
domestic elections.1 3 Political scientists deal with the political incor-
136 But see IMMIGRATION RESEARCH FOR A NEW CENTURY: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PER-
SPECTIVES (Nancy Foner et al. eds. [hereinafter NEW CENTURY] for a promising
start of interdisciplinary scholarship in the area of migration.
137 See generally Stanley A. Renshon, Dual Citizens in America: An Issue of Vast
Proportions and Broad Significance, BACKGROUNDER (Center for Immigration
Studies, Washington, D.C.), July 2000, at 3 (noting that in a 1996 survey of seven-
teen Latin American countries, only seven allowed multiple citizenship, but by
2000, fourteen of the seventeen countries allowed multiple citizenship).
138 Ruth Rubio-Marin, Transnational Politics and the Democratic Nation State:
Normative Challenges of Expatriate Voting and Nationality Retention of Immi-
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poration of immigrants into host societies. Such political membership
generally follows socio-economic assimilation and incorporation.' 39
Unequal political membership of various ethnic groups in the host
state and unequal "voice" may lead to unbalanced political develop-
ment. Historians attempt to isolate the accidents and contingencies of
developments across time and their implications for migration and re-
settlement. Finally, legal and international relations scholars deal
with issues such as the definition of the sovereign nation-state, indi-
vidual rights that transcend borders, and dual nationality. If immigra-
tion transforms the effective boundaries of the state monopoly over
sovereignty, it may be necessary to re-evaluate the very notion of na-
tional immigration policy.
The various bodies of work referred to above are capable of
fruitful cross-fertilization. The work of sociologists, for instance, in the
area of social, linguistic and cultural assimilation, is related to eco-
nomic assimilation and to the broader concept of political membership
and participation examined by political scientists. Similarly, one of
the contingencies of historical development can be discord and dishar-
mony sown by perceived unequal opportunities for political participa-
tion. On an even wider level, political incorporation of immigrants
may ultimately confer rights that span traditional national borders
and thus create the groundwork for studies in international relations.
Likewise, recent scholarship by immigration law authors on multiple
citizenship and sovereignty relates directly to the work in political sci-
ence and international relations, mentioned above. Social networks
studied by anthropologists have an obvious effect upon the actual and
perceived costs of migration, which can easily be incorporated into the
quantitative and qualitative work of economists who focus on the costs
and returns of international migration. Urban studies scholars' analy-
ses of spatial segregation of immigrant communities can contribute to
sociologists work on community integration and assimilation. Finally,
emerging work of ethnic studies scholars on "whiteness" is related to
barriers to assimilation. 4 0
grants, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 126-7 & n.42 (2006) (identifying Mexico and the
Dominican Republic as states that permit non-residents to vote, so long as they
return home to cast their ballot).
139 There have been only a few empirical studies of the political incorporation of
immigrants by ethnic origin. For one such interesting work, see Jane Junn, Par-
ticipation in Liberal Democracy: The Political Assimilation of Immigrants and
Ethnic Minorities in the United States, in NEW CENTURY, supra note 136 (finding
that while Asian-Americans have the most education among various ethnic groups
and higher median incomes, they are the least politically active of all groups).
140 "Whiteness" in ethnic studies is a relational concept, rather than a biological
one. See generally MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A DIFFERENT COLOR
(199) (examining the role of "whiteness" in the context of immigrant assimilation).
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B: Examples of Possible Syntheses
In Section V, I examined political economy and public choice
frameworks in some detail. As indicated above, interest groups and
the median voter are intimately related to issues of political member-
ship and incorporation into the host society. Thus, the models dis-
cussed in the previous section combine public choice concepts with
formal methods in economic theory. In this sub-section, I describe an
alternative form of synthesis using acculturation and locational theory
as examples.
Immigration (other than purely mental migration or anticipa-
tory acculturation) necessarily involves locational re-settlement along
with appropriate acculturation. Thus, one approach is to start by ex-
amining locational frameworks in disciplines in which they were first
developed. Initially, locational preferences of individuals (for either
cultural or economic reasons) were formally modeled in Tiebout-type
locational choice models in regional economics.14 1 Scholars in other
disciplines, such as sociology, anthropology, and demography have ad-
ded content to locational preferences by observing that cultural prefer-
ences may originate in social networks or in safety nets.14 2 In
Tiebout's original framework, jurisdictions exclude outsiders from free
access to collectively provided goods, thus mimicking "rivalrous" con-
sumption and excludability which are essential characteristics of pri-
vate markets.' 4 3 In the context of international migration, the"charge" for access to a jurisdiction is the implicit fee for belonging to a
social network. This "charge" is often a social bond that embodies re-
ciprocal obligations of trust, loyalty and mutual support. Because of
these network effects, people with similar cultural preferences tend to
congregate together.14 4 Thus, when culture is a locationally-provided
public good, one is likely to observe agglomeration effects similar to
the effects in core-periphery models of trade, as discussed above. Even
the most cursory examination of data reveals this to be the case for
international migrants, regardless of their countries of origin or desti-
nation. Cultural preferences have also been embedded in national im-
141 See generally Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956); Ayre L. Hillman, The Political Economy of Migration Policy, in
MIGRATION: A CHALLENGE FOR EUROPE (Horst Siebert ed.,1993).
142 See, e.g., GLOBAL NETWORKS, LINKED CITIES 43 (Saskia Sassen ed., 2001).
143 See generally Tiebout, supra note 141. The characteristics of markets for pub-
lic and private goods are discussed in detail in any standard text on law and eco-
nomics. See, e.g,. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th ed.,
2003).
144 See GLOBAL NETWORKS, LINKED CITIES, supra note 142, at 43; see also SASKIA
SAASEN, THE GLOBAL CITY 251 (2d ed., 2001); MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE
NETWORK SOCIETY 172 (2d ed., 2000).
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migration policies: for example, the "White Australia" policy, or the
United States' hemispheric quotas on immigration. 14 5
Cultural preferences of prospective migrants may often be sup-
plemented with other selection criteria, imposed by either the host or
source country or both. For example, the "brain drain" models men-
tioned earlier describe how differentiated populations in poorer coun-
tries are often subject to varying immigration incentives set by the
receiving country. It is also possible to conceive of strategic self-selec-
tion criteria, imposed by the prospective immigrants themselves; for
example, family pressure upon individuals migrating abroad to main-
tain sizable remittances to those remaining at home can be viewed as
a selection device to keep low-skilled workers from emigrating.
With respect to the trade-migration relationship, researchers
have not yet formally combined Tiebout-type locational choice or cul-
tural preference models with the trade models discussed above. One
might conjecture, however, that if cultural or locational preferences re-
garding migration are largely independent of economic considerations,
the locational choice would likely weaken the interchangeable rela-
tionship between trade and migration, or strengthen a complementary
relationship. On the other hand, positive economic factors may rein-
force locational choice, and thus reinforce the relationships between
trade and migration predicted by trade models. Thus, the implications
of embedding locational choice or cultural preferences in trade models
depend upon whether they are affected positively by the same eco-
nomic considerations (namely, disparities in expected wages between
source and recipient countries) that affect trade in goods and services.
C: International Relations, Law and Political Economy
Scholarship on migration in the disciplines of international po-
litical economy and international relations is relatively recent, dating
perhaps to the 1980s. 14 6 Furthermore, integration of migration and
trade in these disciplines is, as yet, not developed. 147 Nevertheless,
international political economy and international relations theory of-
145 The latter was repealed in 1965. Immigration and Nationality Act Amend-
ments, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 201(d)-(e), 79 Stat. 911 (1965). The White Australia
policy was discontinued in the 1970s. See generally Fact Sheet, Department of
Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, Australian Government (June 28, 2006),
http://www.immi.gov.au/media/fact-sheets/08abolition.htm).
146 See MIGRATION THEORY: TALKNG ACROSs DISCIPLINES (Carol B. Bretell &
James Hollifield eds., 2000) for a useful attempt at cross-fertilization of various
disciplines.
147 For the most part, scholarship in international relations deals with migration
through its focus on political participation and sovereignty. A discussion of trade
issues does not fit comfortably within its tools of analysis.
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fer a perspective on migration that is distinct from that in economics
or in public choice.
Creation of interest groups is also an ingredient of interna-
tional relations analyses as it is in public choice. The creation of coali-
tions that are large enough may affect national identity and the very
definition of the sovereign state itself.'48 With the development of so-
cial, kinship, informational, and institutional networks, transnational
communities emerge that render the once clear physical boundaries of
the nation-state increasingly irrelevant. From the emergence of trans-
national communities, it is a short step to the creation of rights of
transnational citizenship. While many of these rights are usually cre-
ated by independent judiciaries in the receiving state, interest groups
with powerful political connections may also play a key role. 149 As a
consequence, the capacity of liberal democracies to control migration is
eroded. 1 50 International relations scholars emphasize that coalition
148 It was only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe that the no-
tion of tying populations to specific territorial units developed. In turn, this con-
cept may be related to Weber's definition of sovereignty under which a nation-
state can only exist when the sovereign has monopoly over the legitimate use of
force over a given territory. Weber's definition of state sovereignty was mentioned
by him originally in a lecture in 1918. MAX WEBER, POLITIKS ALS BERUF [POLITICS
AS A VOCATION] 2-3 (H.H. Gerth & Wright Mills trans., Fortress Press 1968)
(1918). For a recent survey of nationality and associated sovereignty policies of
various countries, see CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICES
(Thomas Aleinikoff & Douglas. Klusmeyer eds. Carnegie Endowment for Int'l
Peace 2001). For sample work on immigration and transnational rights see Schil-
ler Glick, Linda Basch & Cristina Szanton-Blanc, From Immigrant to Transim-
migrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration, 68 ANTHROPOGICAL Q. 48
(1995).
149 Sociologists such as Massey have long emphasized the role of social networks
in both sending and receiving countries. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION:
PROSPECTS AND POLICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET (Douglas Massey & J. Edward Tay-
lor eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2004); WORLDS IN MOTION: UNDERSTANDING INTERNA-
TIONAL MIGRATION (Douglas Massey, Joaquin Arango & Graeme Hugo eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 1999). The role of transnational communities in explaining migration
has been explored by several authors, including, Alejandro Portes, Immigration
Theory for a New Century, 31 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 799-825 (1997); Alejandro
Portes, Transnational Communities: Their Emergence and Significance in the
Contemporary World System, in LATIN AMERICA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (R. P.
Koreniewidez & W.C. Smith eds., 1996); SASKIA SAASEN, LOSING CONTROL: SOVER-
EIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
150 See Gary Freeman, Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States
19 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 881 (1995); Gary Freeman, Can Liberal States Control
Unwanted Migration, 534 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 17 (1994). For work
dealing with the U.S. context see DANIEL TISCHENOR, The Politics of Immigration
Reform in the United States 1981-1992, 26 POLITY 333 (1994) and DAVID PLOTKE,
Immigration and Political Incorporation in the Contemporary United States in
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TRADE
building or interest group creation is influenced by three considera-
tions: ideational/cultural factors, economic interests (which are linked
to factor rewards) and by common transnational rights which evolve in
liberal democracies. 151 In this sense, international relations theory
proposes a broader framework of analysis than either economics or
public choice.
Scholars in the law - particularly, immigration lawyers - have
been late to realize the intermingling of international relations and
political economy in the context of migration and state cohesion. For
example, earlier works by political thinkers such as Claude Levi-
Strauss and Myron Weiner have been of interest to legal scholars stud-
ying the area of migration and national security, or alternatively
known as "assimilation crisis. "152 Concepts such as logrolling in politi-
cal choice have found application in "tactical issue linkage" ("interna-
tional logrolling"), for instance through the appendage of labor and
environmental side-agreements to the NAFTA trade accord. Other
scholars have noted that the recent softening of official attitudes to-
ward dual or multiple citizenship in developed and developing coun-
tries alike is a necessary reaction to changing realities of the meaning
of citizenship and national fidelity, brought upon by the larger forces
of global integration.1 5 3 De-centralization of central state control over
HANDBOOK OF INT'L MIGRATION (Charles Hirschman, Philip Kasinitz and Josh
Dewind eds., 1999).
15' A contrary school of thought suggests that central national authority over im-
migration may have been deliberately ceded to local "gatekeepers" including local
municipal authorities, and private, non-state actors. This view goes beyond the
monolithic vision of the central state as being the sole gatekeeper of immigration
policy. For example, in France, de-centralization of immigration enforcement has
been in progress for a quarter century. Since the Deferre laws were enacted in
1982, French municipal town hall authorities have had the authority to examine
validity of marriages between French citizens and aliens. On the other hand, in
the U.S., detecting marriage fraud (committed for purposes of securing immigra-
tion benefits) remains the sole prerogative of federal immigration authorities.
Employer sanctions in the U.S. and Europe, are yet another example of delegation
of immigration enforcement to non-state actors which have existed in most OECD
countries since the 1970s. I leave it up to the reader to decide whether ceding
immigration controls to local authorities and to non-state actors represents the
weakening of central state authority, or instead, an extension of central power.
152 CLAUDE LEvI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 268-269 (1968); INTERNATIONAL MI-
GRATION AND SECURITY (Myron Weiner, ed. 1993).
153 See, e.g., Christopher Rudolph, Globalization, Sovereignty and Migration: A
Conceptual Framework, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 325, 340, 352 (1998-
99); Peter Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L. J.
1411, 1453 (1997) (discussing the historical animosity of states toward multiple
nationality and recent changes in several countries). See generally Linda Bosniak,
Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented Worker Under
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migration and the rise of non-state actors in creating transnational
rights have also occupied the attention of legal scholars working at the
intersection of immigration and foreign affairs. 15 4
Despite the existence of a growing body of work on migration
employing methods and concepts from international relations or inter-
national political economy, there is presently no general, formal analy-
sis of international trade in these disciplines. What analysis there is
of trade in the context of transnational networks has largely focused
on the emergence of regional mega-centers or "global cities" such as
New York, London, Paris or Los Angeles. 15 5 More pertinently to the
present paper, the inter-relationship between international trade and
migration in the context of an international relations framework also
remains for now, undiscovered territory. It may be surmised however,
that the creation of transnational communities is most likely to lead to
enhanced trade in goods and services across areas with physically dis-
tinct boundaries delineating nation-states, even though as indicated
earlier, the nation-state itself may have begun to lose some of its
Weberian attributes of sovereignty. In this sense, it would be reasona-
ble to expect that migration, creation of transnational communities
and international trade in services and goods are mutually self-rein-
forcing phenomena.
United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 955 (1988); Linda Bosniak, Multiple Nation-
ality and the Postnational Transformation of Citizenship, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 979
(2002).
154 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L.
195, 204 (2000) (noting four dimensions of citizenship (political, legal, psychologi-
cal and sociological) and examining the cases of the U.S., Canada, Germany and
Switzerland); Peter Spiro, Non State Actors in Global Politics, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L.
808, 810-811 (1998) (reviewing three books on the de-centralization of central au-
thority and observing the emergence of accommodative international regimes that
include state, sub-state and institutional actors, particularly in matters such as
trade and migration); Peter Spiro, Tracing the International Insinuation of Inter-
national Law, 95 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 50, 50-51 (2001) (discussing the disag-
gregation of national power); see also Thomas Franck, Clan and Superclan, 90 AM.
J. INT'L L. 359, 378-82 (1996) (noting that states in Germany-i.e. the Ldnder-
have considerable authority over matters such as multiple citizenship).
155 See SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY supra note 142, at 3-6. As Sassen observes,
global cities are characterized by inter-relationships among each other to a much
larger extent than the relationships between these cities and other cities in the
national territories where these mega-cities are located. In addition, global cities
may be characterized by the presence of a roving transnational executive class
whose work assignments may require them to spend portions of their work time in
several cities, on a continuing basis.
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TRADE
VII: EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES AND EVIDENCE
Section III above reviewed empirical data on historical trends
in trade, labor and migration flows over a number of years. Somewhat
surprisingly, there have been hardly any rigorous tests of the sub-
stitutability or complementarity relationship between trade and factor
flows, in particular between trade flows and migration. An exception
is the work by the economic historian Jeffrey Williamson and his col-
leagues, and in this section, I draw upon some of their work. 156
Conceptually, the relationship between trade and migration
can be addressed in one of two alternative ways. First, considering an
initial position of little or no trade in goods and services, what is the
effect of trade liberalization upon incentives to migrate? As indicated
in Section IV above, in the simplest type of trade models, the answer is
unambiguous. Trade liberalization leads to a decline in incentives to
migrate, implying that trade and migration are substitutes. However,
the issue may be phrased alternatively as well. Given an initial posi-
tion of factor immobility (accomplished by effective restrictions on la-
bor and capital movements), what is the effect of permitting free factor
mobility (such as for example, within the European Union), upon trade
in goods and services? In the context of the basic trade models dis-
cussed in Section IV, the same answer emerges, namely, increased
capital and labor mobility equalizes capital-labor ratios across coun-
tries and eliminates the basis for trade. Once again, migration (and
capital movements) is a substitute for trade in goods and services.
These classical results are subject to change when any of the
simplifying assumptions of the basic framework are altered. Thus, if
the basis for trade is something other than differential factor endow-
ments, if there are increasing returns to scale, specific factors or in-
puts (other than labor and capital), imperfections in goods or factor
markets, then the predicted relationship between trade and migration
is ambiguous and highly model-dependent. 157 These complexities
were discussed in Section IV above. However, in a very stylized frame-
156 See generally William Collins, Kevin O'Rourke & Jeffrey Williamson, Were
Trade and Factor Mobility Substitutes in History? (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 6059, 1997), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w6059 [hereinafter Trade and Factor Mobility]; Timothy Hatton & Jeffrey Wil-
liamson, What Fundamentals Drive World Migration (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 8159, 2003), http://econrsss.anu.edu.au/pdf/DP458.pdf
[hereinafter Fundamentals]; Jeffrey Williamson, Winners and Losers Over Two
Centuries of Globalization (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
9161, 2002), http://www.nber.orgpapers/29161.pdf.
157 See generally Collins et al, supra note 156, at 1 (stating generally that "theory
is ambiguous" as to the substitutability of trade and factor mobility); Fundamen-
tals, supra note 156, at 5 (discussing the impact of increasing returns to scale).
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work, the presence of an additional input, say, land, can be shown to
lead to trade-factor flow complementarity, particularly, if the addi-
tional input is subject to natural increase.' 5 8 If land is the additional
input, the land frontier may be subject to expansion. 159 Such an as-
sumption is particularly realistic for the New World, certainly until
the end of the nineteenth century in the western United States and for
a few years later in the rest of the New World.
Interestingly, the concept of an endogenous land frontier lends
itself to application in the context of today's Third World as well.' 60
For example, with increasing globalization and a boom in the exports
of labor-intensive manufactured goods, Third World cities are likely to
experience rapid growth in size and associated infrastructure.' 6 1 As a
consequence, the relative rate of return on capital increases, thereby
attracting foreign capital inflows, i.e., increased trade flows are com-
plemented by increased capital flows in this context. 162
(A): Time Series Tests
It is possible to perform simple time series regression tests over
the period 1870-1939 (truncated into two time periods, in order to ex-
clude the inter-war years 1914-1918). 163 By the late 1930s, the loom-
ing clouds of the Second World War had disrupted normal trade
patterns so that the period after the 1930s is excluded as well.
The basic estimating equation regresses real absolute trade
flows (defined as the deflated sum of exports plus imports) on a variety
of explanatory variables including, gross migration flows, net capital
flows (measured by the absolute amount of the current account imbal-
ance), time trend variables, deflated tariff revenue and a transport
cost variable. 164 Symbolically, the regression equation is:
Real Trade Flows = a + [3 MIG + 32 CAP + P3 TR + [34 TF + t + E
Where MIG is gross migration, CAP is the net deflated absolute cur-
rent account, TR is a measure of tariff revenue, and TF is an index of
transport costs and t a time trend variable.
Aside from possible misspecification and the presence of non-
stationarity in the long-term time series, a possible shortcoming of the
estimating equation is the fact that the key dependent variables are
158 See Collins et al, supra note 156, at 5-6 (discussing the different implications of
owning land).
159 Id. at 7.
160 Id. at 8.
161 ALLEN KELLEY & JEFFREY WILLIAMSON, WHAT DRIvEs THIRD WORLD CITY
GROWTH? 27-31 (1984).162 Id. at 34-37; see also Fundamentals, supra note 156, at 5.
163 Collins et al, supra note 156, at 1, 13.
164 Id. at 11-13.
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not independent of each other.1" 5 For example, labor and capital
flows are expected to be related to each other. 166 As a consequence of
such interdependence, estimated values for the coefficients in the
above regression relationship are likely to be biased. Nevertheless,
estimation of the equation may be useful in providing at least some
insight into the trade-migration relationship.
The results of the time series analysis for the U.S., Canada,
Australia and the United Kingdom (i.e. including both the New World
and the dominant Old World country at that time) do not support the
hypothesis of substitutability between trade flows and factor flows.' 67
The equation is estimated separately for two time periods, i.e. 1872-
1913 and 1919-1939, in order to account for the possible effect of an
endogenous land frontier. 168 In order to be consistent with the sub-
stitutability hypothesis, the estimated coefficients 3, and P2 in the
above relationship would be expected to be statistically negative. 169
At the standard 5 percent level of significance, this hypothesis fails to
find any empirical support. 170 If there is a relationship at all between
trade flows and factor flows, it is one of complementarity between
trade flows and migration, especially over the earlier period 1872-
1913.171
(B): Cross-Section Panel Data Tests
Pooled cross-section data tests over the period 1870-1940 have
also been performed. 172 The estimating equation now is:
(Trade/GDP) = a + YNETMIG + y2(CA/GDP) + y3TR + Y4 TF + Scale
Variables + E
Where tariff and transport cost variables are defined as earlier and
NETMIG is a measure of net migration, while (CA/GDP) is the current
account to GDP ratio for each decade in the time period. Similarly,
165 To econometricians, this is known as the presence of multicollinearity. An ap-
propriate technique to obtain unbiased estimates in this case, is by means of "in-
strumental variables". In the present case, it is not at all clear if suitable
"instruments" can be found.
166 In part, this may stem from the fact that skilled labor embodies "human capi-
tal." In addition, migrating flows of labor may also be accompanied by financial or
physical capital. For example, investment visas or employment-creation visas are
made available to potential entrants under U.S. immigration laws who have in-
vested substantial at risk capital in the U.S.
167 Collins et al, supra note 156, at 15.
168 Id. at 13.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 14.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 17.
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trade flows are deflated by GDP in order to account for country size
variations. 1 73 One would expect the same concerns about dependence
between migration flows and capital flows as mentioned earlier (i.e.
the presence of "multicollinearity"). However, as indicated above, the
equation is estimated without suitable instrumental variables to cor-
rect for serial correlation over each decade separately.
The empirical results yield a statistically significant negative
estimate for the tariff variable, as expected. 174 Higher tariffs are ex-
pected to inhibit trade flows. However, the key relationship of interest
here - the relationship between trade and factor flows - exhibits an
empirically weak association. 175 Once again, there is little or no em-
pirical support (in these tests) for the substitutability hypothesis be-
tween trade and migration, and if anything, there may be some
evidence of mild complementarity between trade and capital flows.' 7 6
These results demonstrate to a limited extent, that accounting
only for economic factors, trade flows and migration flows do not ap-
pear to be empirically related (at least as substitutes) over historical
periods. The strong prediction of simple economic frameworks is
scarcely vindicated. For present purposes, these results may be taken
to indicate both that more empirical testing is necessary and that eco-
nomic factors alone are insufficient to explain the complex set of rela-
tionships between trade and factor flows. 177
C: Empirical Results From The Political Economy of Immigration
In previous sections, I have offered perspectives on the trade-
migration relationship drawn from several other disciplines, such as
public choice, anthropology, sociology, and international relations. At
the time of publication, there has been virtually no attempt to analyti-
cally combine approaches from different disciplines in a comprehen-
sive empirically testable framework. There is, however, a body of
empirical literature on the political economy of immigration which
combines two disciplines, namely, political choice and economics. Ex-
amples include work by economic historians such as Timmer and Wil-
liamson. These authors investigate whether over long historical
periods, policy-makers and legislators behaved as though they believed
that trade and migration were substitutes. 17  In other words, these
173 Id. at 15.
174 Id. at 18.
175 Id.
176 See id. at 25.
177 See id. at 24-25.
178 Ashley Timmer & Jeffrey Williamson, Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s:
Labor Markets, Policy Interactions and Globalization Backlash, 24 POPULATION &
DEV. REV. 739, 739 (1998) [hereinafter Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s];
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authors attempt to construct an index of restrictiveness of immigra-
tion policy which is then related to proxy measures of the stance of
trade policy, in addition to certain other factors that may be relevant
to explaining the degree of immigration restrictiveness of a particular
nation. 179
Recall first that the closing of the open land frontiers in the
New World may have significant implications on the stance of immi-
gration policy. More specifically, other things being equal, an open
frontier is likely to mean that immigration policy is more liberal to-
ward prospective newcomers. On the other hand, closing the open
frontier would be expected to lead to more restrictive immigration poli-
cies as the native population begins to experience pressure because of
sociological, economic and cultural reasons, to limit the influx of
newcomers.
While the experiences of various New World countries differed
somewhat in terms of timing of closing of their frontiers, they are qual-
itatively similar. Thus, the existence of an open western frontier in
the U.S. may have come to an end in the 1890s, i s ° and the Pampas of
Argentina filled up shortly thereafter.' The end of Canada's Prairie
Boom in the 1920s may be viewed as the closing of the early open fron-
tier in that country.' 8 2
In general, immigration of low-skilled labor from the Old World
into the New World would be expected to increase income inequality in
the rich New World countries, in the same manner as would imports of
unskilled labor-intensive goods into the latter."13 Assuming the exis-
tence of at least a partially democratic franchise in the recipient coun-
tries, the question of interest is the nature of the appropriate response
by host country governments. If trade and migration were comple-
ments in the pre-1920 New World, governments in the latter needed to
utilize only one policy, i.e. they would need to restrict immigration or
Ashley Timmer & Jeffrey Williamson, Racism, Xenophobia or Markets? The Politi-
cal Economy of Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s 22-23 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 5867, 1996), http://www.nber.org/papers/w5867.pdf
[hereinafter Racism, Xenophobia or Markets?].
179 Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s, supra note 178, at 740-742.180 Id. at 739; see also Collins et al, supra note 156, at 21.
181 Collins et al, supra note 156, at 21. For additional details on immigration pat-
terns in Argentina, see, Andres Solimano, Development Cycles, Political Regimes
and International Migration: Argentina in the Twentieth Century (Economic De-
velopment Division, Paper LC/P 1847-P, United Nations Office in Chile).
182 See Racism, Xenophobia and Markets?, supra note 178, at 28.
183 Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s, supra note 178, at 748; see also Funda-
mentals, supra note 156, at 11-12 (discussing how opening the doors to lower
skilled workers from poorer parts of the world skewed United States income
distribution).
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restrict imports of unskilled labor-intensive goods, but not necessarily
both. What did New World governments actually do over this period?
In order to test for the influence of various economic and other
variables, including trade and immigration policies, a summary mea-
sure of the stance of immigration policy must first be constructed. The
index used by Timmer and Williamson ranges from -5.0 (very anti-im-
migration) to 5.0 (very liberal).' The immigration policy variable is
then regressed on variables intended to capture both economic and
non-economic factors, over the period 1860-1930 in the New World
countries. Results indicate the presence of statistically significant
lagged dependent variable (indicating "persistence" or time-delayed
changes in immigration policy), as well as, the significance of the
lagged relative position of unskilled labor in income distribution, as
predicted a priori.1 85 In other words, when the relative position of un-
skilled labor in income distribution in the host country improves, i.e.
unskilled labor becomes more scarce, immigration policy becomes
more liberal toward newcomers, but after a time lag.186 A time lag is
consistent with the generally slow pace of legislative enactments.1 7
On the other hand, the larger the wage difference between unskilled
labor in the source and host countries, the more restrictive is host
country immigration policy.' The latter result can be reconciled with
the existing literature on "quality" of immigrants, in the sense that a
lower immigrant wage rate signals lower "quality" of immigrants,
which through the socio-political process generates an anti-immigra-
tion sentiment.'" 9 Most telling, however, is the result that the ratio of
trade to GDP is found to be insignificant in explaining immigration
policy. 9 ' There is no evidence in these tests of any systematic rela-
tionship between trade policy and immigration policy, or at least, pol-
icy-makers did not appear to act as though trade and immigration
policies were substitutable during the period of an open frontier in the
New World.
VIII: CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the relationship between interna-
tional trade and international migration from a variety of perspec-
tives. Although there has been a prodigious amount of scholarship in
184 Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s, supra note 178, at 740-41.
185 Id. at 751.
186 See id.; Racism, Xenophobia and Markets?, supra note 178, at 30.
187 Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s, supra note 178, at 751.
188 Racism, Xenophobia and Markets?, supra note 178, at 30-31; see also Immigra-
tion Policy Prior to the 1930s, supra note 178, at 753, 760.
189 See Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s, supra note 178, at 756-57.
190 Racism, Xenophobia and Markets?, supra note 178, Id. at 30.
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various disciplines in both of these areas, there has been very little
effort to synthesize them, either within a particular discipline or
across disciplines. A specific issue of focus has been the effect of trade
liberalization upon incentives to migrate, and conversely, the effect of
liberal international migration upon the patterns and extent of inter-
national trade. Such a query is of immediate relevance to policy-mak-
ers to ensure consistency and coordination across various policies
adopted by law-makers. Unless the inter-relationship between trade
and migration is both well-defined and known, it is quite possible for a
policy regarding international trade, for example, to undermine the re-
sults desired from extant immigration policy.
History itself offers examples of diverse policies pursued across
countries and over time. For example, the European Union chose to
pursue both trade liberalization and free mobility of labor (along with
other "freedoms") simultaneously during the formation of the Commu-
nity. On the other hand, the United States negotiated and imple-
mented the NAFTA trade agreement with Canada and Mexico, but
NAFTA itself was concerned with free trade between these nations;
immigration matters were specifically excluded from the treaty and
left to other legislation. Over the course of history, nations have vari-
ously chosen to couple and de-couple trade and migration policies over
different periods of time. Until the early years of the twentieth cen-
tury, the United States generally promoted both free trade and free
immigration, but in the latter part of the twentieth century and con-
tinuing to the present, it has chosen to actively pursue a free trade
agenda, while simultaneously restricting inbound immigration.
Scholars in various disciplines have had varying levels of inter-
est in trade and migration and have applied methods of varying de-
grees of rigor in analyzing trade and migration. For example, the work
of sociologists, anthropologists and demographers has been principally
concerned with issues related to migration, such as acculturation and
assimilation of outsiders within a host country, rather than interna-
tional trade in goods and services. In the past, methods used in these
disciplines have primarily utilized case or cohort field studies of sam-
ple groups of individuals. More recently however, a newer generation
of researchers in these disciplines has begun to turn to utilize the for-
mal techniques of empirical economists to study assimilation and in-
corporation of aliens and related issues.
Political and socio-economic incorporation of aliens has also
been of interest to international relations theorists and to political
scientists. Political and economic incorporation of aliens, along with
unimpeded transnational migration, has implications for the very defi-
nition of the sovereign state. International relations scholars have
concerned themselves with the possible loss of sovereignty in the face
of such migration and the acquisition of rights of transnational citizen-
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ship by immigrants and others. Political scientists and public choice
theorists have similarly dealt with incorporation of aliens through lob-
bying and ultimate political enfranchisement. Over time, the profile of
the representative voter in representative democracies undergoes
change and the preferred immigration policy itself evolves.
It should be observed that the disciplines mentioned above
have principally dealt with various facets of the causes and conse-
quences of migration and immigration policy. Issues relating to the in-
ter-relationship between international trade and trade policy are
conspicuously absent in most of this literature. To the extent possible,
I have attempted to offer reasonable conjectures of the policy implica-
tions that might emerge when the existence of both trade and migra-
tion is embedded in frameworks proposed in political science, sociology
or international relations.
In contrast to the latter disciplines, scholarship in economics
has a long history of using formal analytical and empirical methods in
examining trade and migration. For the most part, however, economic
researchers working in these areas have proceeded along different
lines and have remained largely within their sub-fields. Trade theo-
rists have generally been concerned with explaining patterns and con-
sequences of trade, with peripheral attention to migration. Migration
has been studied by labor economists, whose dominant focus has been
the effort of migration upon host country wage and skill levels, and the
impact upon fiscal finances in the latter country. However, just as the
immigration of workers with particular skills sets and lower wage de-
mands is apt to displace native workers with similar skills, so too with
import of goods from low wage countries. Indeed, on this basic level,
importing goods or workers who produce those goods results in similar
painful and disruptive consequences for certain workers in the import-
ing country. In terms of immediate economic impacts, there is an inti-
mate relation between trade in goods and the migration of persons.
However, even within this field, more complex and realistic
structures can undermine this intimate relationship. If effects other
than immediate short-term economic impacts are considered, it is
clear, even to the casual observer, that trade with low wage countries
is vastly different than importing low wage workers from these same
countries. Unlike importation of goods, migration of persons has wide-
ranging implications for cultural, linguistic, spatial and socio-political
assimilation and incorporation.
A satisfactory analysis of the relationship between trade and
migration with attention to economic and socio-cultural aspects of the
relationship requires the integration and synthesis of work from sev-
eral disciplines. At present, such a comprehensive framework does not
exist. In time, one would expect more significant cross-fertilization
and discourse across disciplines, and the possible emergence of a more
2006] INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND TRADE 175
comprehensive framework that may be capable of empirical validation.
In the present paper and for now, I have endeavored to provide an
outline of a blueprint for such a synthetic framework.
